Revisiting \u3ci\u3eBrown v. Board of Education\u3c/i\u3e: A Cultural, Historical-Legal, and Political Perspective by Combs, Michael W. & Combs, Gwendolyn
University of Nebraska - Lincoln 
DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln 
Management Department Faculty Publications Management Department 
Spring 2005 
Revisiting Brown v. Board of Education: A Cultural, Historical-
Legal, and Political Perspective 
Michael W. Combs 
University of Nebraska - Lincoln, mcombs1@unl.edu 
Gwendolyn Combs 
University of Nebraska - Lincoln, gcombs2@unl.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/managementfacpub 
 Part of the Management Sciences and Quantitative Methods Commons 
Combs, Michael W. and Combs, Gwendolyn, "Revisiting Brown v. Board of Education: A Cultural, Historical-
Legal, and Political Perspective" (2005). Management Department Faculty Publications. 48. 
https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/managementfacpub/48 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Management Department at 
DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. It has been accepted for inclusion in Management Department 
Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. 






This Article explores how Brown v. Board of Education1 and sub-
sequent Court decisions2 have impacted the structure of society and
racial cultural tradition of America. Brown ranks among the first in-
stances in which a modern American institution actually tackled the
cultural basis of racism and discrimination.  More directly, during oral
arguments to consider the separate but equal doctrine of Plessy v. Fer-
guson,3 the Justices seemed to have understood the political and cul-
tural importance of possibly overturning the doctrine that shaped race
relations for more than fifty years.4  The Warren Court’s strategy to
treat severally the constitutional pronouncement and the remedial de-
cree suggests its awareness of how the separate but equal doctrine
legitimated and gave rise to the institution of racial practices and a
way of life that was clearly manifested throughout the American soci-
ety.  These racial practices and patterns were particularly manifested
in the South.5  The separate but equal doctrine did not create the ra-
cial culture addressed in Brown and subsequent decisions, but rather
* Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Nebraska-Lincoln.
** Professor, Department of Management, University of Nebraska-Lincoln.
1. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ.,
402 U.S. 1 (1971); Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968); Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1
(1958).
3. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
4. ARGUMENT: THE ORAL ARGUMENT BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT IN BROWN V.
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF TOPEKA, 1952-55 (Leon Friedman ed., 1969).
5. See generally JOHN HOPE FRANKLIN, RACE AND HISTORY (1989); GEORGE M. FRED-
RICKSON, RACISM:  A SHORT HISTORY (2002).
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represented the constitutionalization of post-Civil War cultural tradi-
tions and policy.6
Since Brown, considerable attention has been devoted to the ca-
pacity and limitations of the Supreme Court and courts in general to
bring about social change.  In the literature, at least three large camps
have emerged.  One camp insists that the courts, especially the Su-
preme Court, have played a significant role in policy-making.7  Some
in this camp argue that the courts’ unique structural location permits
them to protect the rights of individuals and groups.8  The second
camp generally has an unfavorable perception of a signal participatory
role of the Supreme Court and lower courts in policy-making.  Re-
searchers in this camp bring forth powerful arguments that question
the capacity and legitimacy of the courts’ involvement and institu-
tional reform.9  The third camp sees the courts, particularly the Su-
preme Court, as neither being all powerful, nor entirely impotent.
Scholars in this camp assume a middle ground.  They argue that under
certain circumstances courts can be agents of social change, represent
the politically weak, and advance the interest of the excluded and
under-represented.10  The effort of this Article is not to support any of
these three camps, but rather to examine the extent to which the Su-
preme Court and the principles of Brown and subsequent decisions
have served as cultural transformers in the area of race.
6. See FRANKLIN, supra note 5, at 142; C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF
JIM CROW 54 (1966) [hereinafter WOODWARD, STRANGE CAREER].
7. See generally ARCHIBALD COX, THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN
GOVERNMENT (1976); JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL
REVIEW (1980); Michael W. Combs, The Policy-Making Role of the Courts of Appeals in North-
ern School Desegregation: Ambiguity and Judicial Policy-Making, 35 W. POL. Q. 359 (1982).
8. See MARTIN SHAPIRO, FREEDOM OF SPEECH (1966); Jonathan D. Casper, The Supreme
Court and National Policy Making, 70 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 50 (1976); Michael W. Combs, The
Federal Judiciary and Northern School Desegregation: Law, Politics, and Judicial Management, 16
PUBLIUS: J. FEDERALISM 33 (1986) [hereinafter Combs, Federal Judiciary].
9. See, e.g., GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT
SOCIAL CHANGE? (1991); STUART A. SCHEINGOLD, THE POLITICS OF RIGHTS: LAWYERS, PUBLIC
POLICY, AND POLITICAL CHANGE (1974).
10. BRADLEY C. CANON & CHARLES A. JOHNSON, JUDICIAL POLICIES: IMPLEMENTATION
AND IMPACT (2d ed. 1999); Lucius J. Barker, Black Americans and the Burger Court: Implica-
tions for the Political System, 1973 WASH. U. L.Q. 747 [hereinafter Barker, Black Americans];
Lucius J. Barker, Limits of Political Strategy: A Systemic View of the African American Experi-
ence, 88 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1 (1994); Lucius J. Barker, Third Parties in Litigation: A Systemic
View of the Judicial Function, 29 J. POL. 41 (1967); Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a De-
mocracy: The Role of the Supreme Court as a National Policy-Maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279 (1957).
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Brown and subsequent decisions have had a powerful role in
transforming the culture of America.11  Culture references the endur-
ing value system; the practices of signification, ideas, beliefs, symbols,
rules, and norms that are transmitted from generation to generation.
Through its decisions, the Supreme Court provided the catalyst and
thrust for the recreation of the boundaries between the “we” and the
“they” in America.  The fundamental properties of liberal democracy
or liberalism, such as equality, individualism, and freedom, did not
govern the social relations between African Americans and Whites.
How societal institutions and governmental entities responded to Af-
rican Americans including their person, their history, and their inter-
ests, and how societal symbols and rules further perpetuated the status
of African Americans as outsiders of the American society.12  Largely,
the effort here is to assess the cultural focus of Brown and subsequent
decisions, their impact on the behavior of decision makers and institu-
tions, and their impact on the conflict over race in America.
The motivation for this study stems from several factors.  First, in
more recent times, a number of scholars have called for the inclusion
of cultural perspectives in research in political science on courts and
other policy-making institutions.13  Second, scholars have character-
ized culture as an analytical tool, including and reaching beyond the
shared values and common knowledge approach to the practice-ori-
ented approach.14  Political science scholar Lisa Wedeen, for example,
11. See JAMES DAVISON HUNTER, CULTURE WARS: THE STRUGGLE TO DEFINE AMERICA
(1991); Mark Kessler, Legal Mobilization for Social Reform: Power and the Politics of Agenda
Setting, 24 L. & SOC’Y REV. 121 (1990).
12. See FRANKLIN, supra note 5; GEORGE M. FREDRICKSON, THE BLACK IMAGE IN THE
WHITE MIND (1971); JAMES OAKES, SLAVERY AND FREEDOM (1990); THOMAS R. ROCHON,
CULTURE MOVES 54-94 (1998).
13. Cf. Robert W. Jackman & Ross A. Miller, A Renaissance of Political Culture?, 40 AM. J.
POL. SCI. 632 (1996) (stating that there is “little evidence to indicate a systematic relationship
between political culture and political and economic performance” ). See generally ROSENBERG,
supra note 9; AUSTIN SARAT & THOMAS R. KEARNS, LAW IN THE DOMAINS OF CULTURE (1988);
ROBERT C. SMITH & RICHARD SELTZER, RACE, CLASS, AND CULTURE: A STUDY IN AFRO-
AMERICAN MASS OPINION (1992); Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations?, 72 FOR-
EIGN AFF. 22 (1993); Stella M. Nkomo, The Emperor Has No Clothes: Rewriting “Race in Orga-
nizations,” 17 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 487 (1992); Austin Sarat & Jonathan Simon, Beyond Legal
Realism?: Cultural Analysis, Cultural Studies, and the Situation of Legal Scholarship, 13 YALE
J.L. & HUMAN. 3 (2001); Rogers M. Smith, Political Jurisprudence, The “New Institutionalism,”
and the Future of Public Law, 82 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 89 (1988).
14. SEYLA BENHABIB, THE CLAIMS OF CULTURE: EQUALITY AND DIVERSITY IN THE
GLOBAL ERA (2002); DONALD J. DEVINE, THE POLITICAL CULTURE OF THE UNITED STATES
(1972); CLIFFORD GEERTZ, THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURE (1973); GEERT HOFSTEDE, CUL-
TURE’S CONSEQUENCES: INTERNATIONAL DIFFERENCES IN WORK-RELATED VALUES (1984); 2
TALCOTT PARSONS, Introduction to Culture and the Social System, in THEORIES OF SOCIETY:
FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY (Talcott Parsons et al. eds., 1961); Avner
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suggests looking at observable behavior as “existing inside historical
processes.”15  Culture also is argued to be “the totality of social sys-
tems and practices of signification, representation, and symbolism that
has an autonomous logic of their own, a logic separated from and not
reducible to the intentions of those through whose actions and doings
its emerges and is reproduced.”16  Another noted scholar Rosemary
Coombe offers that culture is both “the medium and consequence of
social differences, inequalities, dominations, and exploitations, the
form of the inscription and the means of their collective and individual
imbrications.”17  Third, the embracement of multiculturalism as a
means to include African American, women, and other racial and eth-
nic groups demands more concentration on the salience of culture.
While Brown provided the legal and moral thrusts for inclusionary
movements, there is little, if any, systematic research that has assessed
the cultural impact of Brown and subsequent decisions or how the
principles of Brown shaped and continue to shape the conflict over
race in America and the distribution of power and opportunities along
racial lines.  The examinations have generally pursued two paths: (1)
the role of the Supreme Court as a policy-maker; and (2) the expan-
sion of the rights of African Americans in the context of liberal
democracy.18
To reiterate, the purpose of this Article is to explore the cultural
significance of Brown v. Board of Education and subsequent deci-
sions.  Even now, some scholars argue that prior to Brown, African
Americans were outsiders, meaning that they were not “acculturated
in the appropriate way”19 or were not evaluated as “fellow members
whose presence and participation is valuable itself.”20  More directly,
the effort of this Article is to assess how Brown, subsequent decisions,
and legislation of the 1960s have influenced society’s modes of
thought and conceptualization of the racial conflict.
Greif, Cultural Beliefs and the Organization of Society: A Historical and Theoretical Reflection on
Collectivist and Individualist Societies, 102 J. POL. ECON. 912 (1994); Lisa Wedeen, Conceptualiz-
ing Culture: Possibilities for Political Science, 96 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 713 (2002).
15. Wedeen, supra note 14, at 714.
16. BENHABIB, supra note 14, at 3.
17. Rosemary J. Coombe, Contingent Articulations: A Critical Cultural Studies of Law, in
LAW IN THE DOMAINS OF CULTURE 21, 33 (Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns eds., 1998).
18. See generally JENNIFER L. HOCHSCHILD, THE NEW AMERICAN DILEMMA: LIBERAL DE-
MOCRACY AND SCHOOL DESEGREGATION (1984); Barker, Black Americans, supra note 10;
Michael W. Combs, The Supreme Court and African Americans: Personnel and Policy Transfor-
mations, 36 HOW. L.J. 139 (1993) [hereinafter Combs, Supreme Court].
19. BENHABIB, supra note 14, at 7.
20. MATTHEW HOLDEN, JR., THE DIVISIBLE REPUBLIC 1 (1973).
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This Article revisits Brown v. Board of Education to assess the
cultural, historical, legal, and political significance.  Part I will intro-
duce the concept of liberal democracy and racism in a historical-cul-
tural context as it relates to the decision in Brown v. Board of
Education.  Part II will analyze the legitimization of the cultural per-
spectives of racism as related to the Brown v. Board of Education de-
cision.  Part III will discuss the ways in which Brown v. Board of
Education served as a catalyst for cultural transformation in America.
Part IV examines the opposition to Brown v. Board of Education fos-
tered throughout the presidential election of 1964.  Finally, this Arti-
cle will analyze Brown v. Board of Education in an era of cultural
racial diversionary standpatism.  In conclusion, this Article will briefly
address the conflict between the culture of racial progressive gradual-
ism and racial standpatism, arguing that in the twenty-first century
there is still a cultural war on race in America.
I. BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION :
LIBERAL DEMOCRACY AND RACISM IN
HISTORICAL-CULTURAL CONTEXT
In Brown, the Supreme Court made a paradigmatic departure
from the separate but equal doctrine and the historical processes that
governed race and race relations in America for more than three hun-
dred and fifty years.21  The separate but equal doctrine reflected and
symbolized the historical cultural tradition that severely distinguished
African Americans and Whites.  Liberal democracy and racism shared
in the establishment of racial distinction, as well as the defense of the
patterns of beliefs and values that distinguished African Americans
and Whites.  In that sense, both served as an ideology.22  More di-
rectly, Whites were elevated, while African Americans were subordi-
nated.23  Color and phenotype became the basis for inclusion and
exclusion.
21. See RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDU-
CATION AND BLACK AMERICA’S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY (1976); J. HARVIE WILKINSON III,
FROM BROWN TO BAKKE: THE SUPREME COURT AND SCHOOL INTEGRATION: 1954-1978 (1979);
Robert L. Carter, The Warren Court and Desgregation, 67 MICH. L. REV. 237 (1968).
22. For a characterization of an ideology, see generally LUCIUS J. BARKER ET AL., AFRICAN
AMERICANS AND THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SYSTEM (4th ed. 1999); DEVINE, supra note 14 ;
CLIFFORD GEERTZ, THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES (1973); C. WRIGHT MILLS, THE MARX-
ISTS (1963); MILTON ROKEACH, BELIEFS, ATTITUDES, AND VALUES (1968).
23. HOCHSCHILD, supra note 18; HOLDEN, supra note 20.
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Liberal democracy remains the dominant political philosophy in
America.  It structures interpretations of “human nature, the origins
of government, and the relationship between individuals and govern-
ment and between government and society.”24  The goals of liberal
democracy which are freedom, individualism, and equality, while the
goal of racism, however, seems to fly in the face of liberal democracy.
Racism provides the basis for the exclusion of African Americans and
other racial groups from the fundamental goals of liberal democracy,
freedom, individualism, and equality.  Several scholars have sought to
assess the relationship between liberalism and racism.  Three schools
of thought have surfaced.  The anomaly thesis assumes that racism is
an abnormal growth on an otherwise healthy American democracy.
The anomaly thesis is encapsulated in Gunnar Myrdal’s An American
Dilemma.25  The symbiosis thesis insists that liberalism and racism in
America functioned so as to reinforce one another.26  David Goldberg
posits that “[a]s modernity’s definitive doctrine of self and society, of
morality and politics, liberalism serves to legitimate ideologically and
to rationalize politico-economically prevailing sets of racialized condi-
tions and racists exclusions.”27  Goldberg also argues that racial defini-
tions and discourse have from “their outset followed an independent
set of logics, related to and intersecting with economic, political, legal,
and cultural considerations, to be sure, but with assumptions, con-
cerns, projects, and goals that can properly be identified as their
own.”28  Throughout American history, manifestations of racism and
liberalism supported each other.29  The final thesis is the multiple tra-
ditions view that argues that “American political actors have always
promoted civic ideologies that blend liberal, democratic republican,
and egalitarian ascriptive elements in various combinations designed
to be politically popular.”30  In this work, it is assumed that the status
of African Americans in the historical and cultural contexts, emerges
24. LUCIUS J. BARKER ET AL., CIVIL LIBERTIES AND THE CONSTITUTION:  CASES AND COM-
MENTARIES (1999).
25. GUNNAR MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA (1944).
26. See DAVID THEO GOLDBERG, RACIST CULTURE: PHILOSOPHY AND THE POLITICS OF
MEANING (1993); HOCHSCHILD, supra note 18; Joe Feagin & Melvin P. Sikes, Changing the
Color Line: The Future of U.S. Racism, in RACISM 407 (Martin Bulmer & John Solomos eds.,
1999); George Fredrickson, Social Origins of American Racism, in RACISM, supra, at 70.
27. GOLDBERG, supra note 26, at 1.
28. Id. at 27.
29. ROGERS M. SMITH, CIVIC IDEALS 6 (1997); Roger Smith, Beyond Tocqueville, Myrdal,
and Hartz: The Multiple Traditions in America, 87 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 549 (1993).
30. For an in-depth discussion of the anomaly and symbiosis theses, see HOCHSCHILD, supra
note 18, at 1-12.
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from the re-enforcement quality of liberal values and institutions and
their support of inequalities on the basis of race.
The American colonies, for example, emerged in the formative
years of liberal democracy and biological racism, which has its roots in
the Inquisition of Spain and Portugal.  The Inquisition was instituted
“to . . . make sure those of Jewish ancestry were kept apart and out of
the mainstream of society, regardless of what they believed, or what
church they belonged to.”31  Biological racism was a closed system,
meaning that neither legal nor social processes granted those being
discriminated against the means to escape.32  Originally, the Jews were
the targets, but this form of racism was expanded after the “discovery
of America,” influencing how Europeans dealt with Native Americans
and Africans.33  This form of racism also assumed the superiority of
Whites or White supremacy.   Increasingly, Whiteness became the ba-
sis of evaluation.34
Various theories evolved in the justification of the subordination
and enslavement of non-Whites in the Americas.  The list is quite
lengthy, including the incapable thesis, the natural slaves thesis, the
degenerative thesis, and the polygenetic thesis.35  The common thread
in all of these theories was the notion of White superiority, which sig-
nificantly shaped the culture of the American colonies.  The culture of
the colonies also embraced the concept that “Africans became [B]lack
because of Divine Action, and were thereby made permanently infer-
ior.”36  The colonies instilled the value that being White was the best.
Several liberal thinkers incorporated some elements of these theories
of justification in their writing (John Locke, Montesquieu, and David
Hume).37  Locke blamed the Africans and the Native Americans for
their treatment by the Europeans.38  Both the Africans and Native
Americans failed to mix their labor with the land, which, in a Lockean
sense, did not create property.39  Locke utilized the concept of a “just
war,” which meant that the captured Africans had forfeited their
31. Richard H. Popkin, The Philosophical Bases of Modern Racism, in PHILOSOPHY AND
THE CIVILIZING ARTS 6 (Craig Walton & John P. Anton eds., 1974).
32. Id.
33. Id. at 129.
34. Id. at 152.
35. Id. at 31.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 132.
38. See generally GOLDBERG, supra note 26; Popkin, supra note 31.
39. GOLDBERG, supra note 26; Popkin, supra note 31.
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claim to life.40  Richard Popkin argued that Locke contended that the
Africans and Native Americans “had properly lost their liberty . . .
and hence could be enslaved.”41
The institutionalization of liberal democracy and racism occurred
in tandem in the colonies that would eventually become the United
States of America.42  By the time of the revolt against British rule,
liberalism and racism, premised on the dichotomy of inferiority and
superiority, were well established, which meant that the legal system
denied certain basic rights to African Americans that were commonly
granted to others.  The institution of slavery not only enslaved African
Americans, but also “permitted no independence of thought, no op-
portunity to improve their minds or their talents or to worship freely,
no right to own or dispose of property, and no protection against mis-
carriages of justice or cruel and unreasonable punishments.”43  Slav-
ery became the lens through which the American society saw African
Americans and African Americans saw others and themselves.  The
word Negro became a compendium: the complete loss of freedom; the
loss of humanity; cursed by God and nature; skin color a punishment
by God; kinlessness and natal alienation; the social dead; the property
of others; the prerogative of the master; denial of all standing in soci-
ety; the universality of superiority and inferiority; the expression of
power and powerlessness; the expression of morality and immorality;
and the expression of kinlessness and filth.44
The Declaration of Independence and the Constitution were and
remain the most clear and candid synergism of liberal democracy and
racism in the American culture.  These founding documents extolled
freedom and racism, “launching the continuing battle between . . .
race, on the one hand, and . . . equality and complete human fellow-
ship, on the other.”45  At the Constitution Convention, both liberalism
and racism re-enforced one another.46  Representation and taxation
were premised on protecting the institution of slavery.  The Constitu-
tion contained several provisions that displayed sufficient support for
values, attitudes, and practices of racism, including the capture and
rendition of fugitive slaves and the close of the slave trade in 1808.
40. GOLDBERG, supra note 26, at 27.
41. Popkin, supra note 31, at 133.
42. Id.
43. FRANKLIN, supra note 5, at 132.
44. Id.; WINTHROP D. JORDAN, WHITE OVER BLACK (1968); OAKES, supra note 12.
45. FRANKLIN, supra note 5, at 132.
46. See, e.g., HOCHSCHILD, supra note 18.
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Moreover, in the first decade of the new nation, Whites maintained a
code of separation for free African Americans.47  The separation
knew no regional boundaries, keeping African Americans out of the
mainstream of American life.
The years before and after the Civil War witnessed the persis-
tence of the value of separation of African Americans from the main-
stream and the stratification of the concept of equality.  Even some
abolitionists thought that African Americans ought not receive the
equality of Whites.48  As the nation approached the Civil War, leaders
in both major political parties viewed African Americans as different
and inferior.49  The Dred Scott decision was and remains the most
forthright subscription to the principles of liberal democracy and ra-
cism.50  Chief Justice Taney insisted that African Americans “had no
rights which the white man was bound to respect.”51
Immediately after the Civil War, there seemed to be a glimmer of
hope that African Americans would enjoy the fruits of liberalism and
escape the burdens of racism.  But the political gains of African
Americans were not widespread, existing
in a very few communities only temporarily, and they never even
began to achieve the status of a ruling class.  They made no mean-
ingful steps towards economic independence or even stability; and
in no time at all, because of the pressures of the local community
and the neglect of the federal government, they were brought under
the complete economic subservience of the old ruling class.52
The influence of White supremacy and the desire to protect the
womanhood of White women gave rise to the proliferation of terrorist
organizations such as the Klu Klux Klan and White citizen councils.
The three Civil War amendments to the Constitution (the 13th, 14th,
and 15th amendments) and the various civil rights statutes did not suf-
ficiently alter how Whites, institutions, and governments responded to
African Americans.  The practices, shared values, and the symbols of
meaning continued to reflect a society that “[set] race as the first test
of ‘merit’ under the social constitution, or sustains racial hierarchy.”53
47. FRANKLIN, supra note 5.
48. Id. at 138.
49. Id.
50. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857).
51. Id. at 407.
52. FRANKLIN, supra note 5, at 139-40.
53. HOLDEN, supra note 20, at 6.
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The Reconstruction Era soon gave way to forces that labored to
severely restrict the freedom of African Americans, substituting a sys-
tem of segregation in which the personal and political power of Afri-
can Americans would be subordinate to White supremacy.  Biological
racism also blossomed.54  First, one of their most significant accom-
plishments was the Civil Rights Cases of 1883 in which the Supreme
Court decided that the provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1875 re-
garding public accommodation did violence to the Fourteenth
Amendment.55  Second, there was a return to the pre-Civil War forms
of segregation and discrimination perpetrated against free African
Americans, for example, segregated schools, segregated units in the
military, segregated churches, segregated services in institutions; ex-
cluded from the body politics.56  Third, social Darwinists employed
Darwin’s theory of evolution to reject the principle of equality for Af-
rican Americans.  Fourth, the media portrayed African Americans as
“lazy, idle, improvident, immoral, and criminal.”57  Fifth, many Amer-
icans were convinced that “state ways cannot change folkways,”
meaning that any legislation enacted to foster and recognize the
equality of African Americans was destined to fail.58  While many
Americans accepted the futility of law to bring about social change in
the status of African Americans, they supported legislation that
eroded the advances gained by African Americans during Reconstruc-
tion (such as literacy and understanding tests, grandfather clauses, poll
taxes, and white primaries) to the application of liberal democracy.59
Perhaps, the most devastating blow to the rights of African
Americans since slavery was the Plessy v. Ferguson60 decision.  In
Plessy, the Supreme Court gave constitutional footing and legitimacy
to the groundswell efforts to deny individualism and equality to Afri-
can Americans.  The Supreme Court announced the separate but
equal doctrine. Plessy reflected the enormous impact that culture has
on the interpretation of the Constitution and impact the Constitution
has on culture. Plessy is noted for its separate but equal doctrine and
54. C. VANN WOODWARD, ORIGINS OF THE NEW SOUTH (1951) [hereinafter WOODWARD,
ORIGINS]; WOODWARD, STRANGE CAREER, supra note 6.
55. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
56. WOODWARD, STRANGE CAREER, supra note 6.
57. FRANKLIN, supra note 5, at 141.
58. Id.; Michael W. Combs, Courts, Minorities, and the Dominant Coalition: Racial Policies
in Modern America (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Washington University) (on file with au-
thor) [hereinafter Combs, Courts]; see also Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
59. FRANKLIN, supra note 5.
60. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
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the phrase, “color-blind constitution.”61 Plessy disallowed the capac-
ity of law to change cultural traditions and values.  Writing for the
majority, Justice Brown argued, “Legislation is powerless to eradicate
racial instincts or to abolish distinctions based upon physical differ-
ences, and the attempt to do so can only result in accentuating the
difficulties of the present situation.”62
In Plessy, the majority opinion of Justice Brown and the dissent-
ing opinion of Justice Harlan are open windows into the breadth and
height of the White supremacy value in America.  Justices Brown and
Harlan gave explicit support to and even legitimated white supremacy.
Justice Brown took a cavalier approach to the foreseeable or probable
consequences to the legal and constitutional separation of the races:
“If one race be inferior to the other socially, the Constitution of the
United States cannot put them upon the same plane.”63  In his dissent,
Justice Harlan distinguished the social and constitutional construction
of race relations:
The white race deems itself to be the dominant race in this country.
And so it is, in prestige, in achievements, in education, in wealth
and in power.  So, I doubt not, it will continue to be for all time, if it
remains true to its heritage, and holds fast to the principles of con-
stitutional liberty.  But in view of the Constitution, in the eyes of the
law, there is in this country no superior, dominant, ruling class of
citizens.  There is no caste here.  Our constitution is color-blind, and
neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens.64
Justice Harlan evaluated the most probable consequences of the
decision and the laws of segregation.  According to Justice Harlan, the
outcome of the decision stemmed from the capacity of law to initiate
and to bring about social change.  Justice Harlan seemed cognizant of
the power of law to impact perception and beliefs over time.
Over the next fifty-seven years, the separate but equal doctrine
became the cultural symbol through which individual citizens, govern-
ments, and society’s institutions viewed race.65  The separate but equal
doctrine also structured governmental and social institutions’ response
to African Americans.  No aspect of the lives of African Americans
61. Id. at 559.
62. Id. at 551.
63. Id. at 552.
64. Id. at 559 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
65. See generally WOODWARD, STRANGE CAREER, supra note 6; U.S. PRESIDENTIAL COMM.
ON CIVIL RIGHTS, TO SECURE THESE RIGHTS: THE REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT’S COMMITTEE
ON CIVIL RIGHTS (1947) [hereinafter TO SECURE THESE RIGHTS].
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and Whites escaped the influence of the separate but equal doctrine.
The separate but equal doctrine reached beyond the belief that
Whites were superior to the premise that the superior group should
also rule and dominate every aspect of culture.66
The separate but equal doctrine infused the opposition to the
equality of African Americans.  Segregation became the cultural
force—the practice that reinforced the belief that African Americans
were naturally inferior to Whites.  When African Americans and
Whites looked upon the disparity, legitimated and fostered by the sep-
arate but equal doctrine on every hand, they saw evidence of racial
hierarchy.67  Whites enjoyed the advantage, and African Americans
suffered the disadvantage.  The Federal Housing Administration
(FHA) underwriting manual, for example, termed African Americans
and other ethnic minorities “adverse influence,” regarding African
Americans in white neighborhoods.68  The manual stated, “[A] change
in social or racial occupancy generally contributes to instability and a
decline in values.”69  FHA’s policies worked to create African Ameri-
can slums and ghettos.
On every crucial measurement of the perceived good in America,
African Americans were a very distant second.  The Truman Adminis-
tration’s, To Secure These Rights, documented the extent of the dis-
parities between African Americans and Whites.70  Matthew Holden
describes this reality as “[t]he probability that any given African
American person will receive more undesirable results and fewer de-
sirable results is higher than that any similarly circumstanced white
person will receive such results in the same combination.”71
This overview supports the symbiosis thesis.  Over the past four
hundred years, liberal democracy and racism have re-enforced one an-
other.  At every key point in the history of this nation, the two have
been joined.  This would include the settling of the colonies, the estab-
lishing of the institution of slavery, the drafting of the Declaration of
Independence and the Constitution, the abolishing of slavery, the es-
tablishing of the Reconstruction period, and the legitimizing of the
separate but equal era.  Persistently and consistently, the goals of lib-
66. JOHN L. HODGE ET AL., CULTURAL BASES OF RACISM AND GROUP OPPRESSION (1975).
67. The separate but equal doctrine defined the worldview of both Blacks and Whites, sup-
porting the thesis that Whites were superior.
68. See FED. HOUS. ADMIN., UNDERWRITING MANUAL, §§ 934 & 937 (1934).
69. Id.
70. See TO SECURE THESE RIGHTS, supra note 65.
71. HOLDEN, supra note 20, at 6-7.
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eralism and racism merged to the detriment of African Americans in
America.
II. BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION : THE
LEGITIMIZATION OF THE CULTURAL
PERSPECTIVE OF RACISM
In Brown v. Board of Education (Brown I and Brown II), the
Supreme Court legitimated the cultural perspective of racism.  The
Supreme Court granted official status to the perspective that racism
reaches beyond the acts and behavior of individuals and individual
decision-makers to institutions, to values and attitudes commonly
shared, and to practices transmitted in society.  The Brown Court was
not the first to postulate such a perspective.  In Plessy v. Ferguson,
Justice Harlan’s dissent reflected elements of the cultural perspective,
leading him to conclude that the white race was “the dominant race in
this country.”72  Warning that the separate but equal doctrine would
inevitably have widespread consequences for the relationship between
African Americans and Whites, and ultimately upon the status of Af-
rican Americans in America, Justice Harlan argued:
Slavery, as an institution tolerated by law would, it is true, have dis-
appeared from our country, but there would remain a power in the
States, by sinister legislation, to interfere with the full enjoyment of
the blessings of freedom; to regulate civil rights, common to all citi-
zens, upon the basis of race, and to place in a condition of legal
inferiority a large body of American citizens . . . .73
In the 1940s, the focus on the cultural perspective as the means of
eliminating racism gained momentum.  Perhaps, the most bold and
candid embracement of such a perspective might be found in the gov-
ernment report entitled, To Secure These Rights.74  The publication
was issued by the Civil Rights Commission appointed by President
Harry S. Truman.  The report evaluated the impact of the separate but
equal doctrine and the status of African Americans in the context of
the American heritage, which promised freedom and equality to all
citizens of America.75  The report examined the conditions of rights in
America in terms of (1) the right to safety and security of the person;
(2) the right to citizenship and its privileges; (3) the right to freedom
72. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 559.
73. Id. at 563.




of conscience and expression; and (4) the right to equality of opportu-
nity.  The data supported the conclusion that the American heritage
did not describe the experiences of African Americans.76  The report
recognized the cultural basis of racism.
The adoption of specific legislation, the implementation of laws or
the development of new administrative policies and procedures can-
not alone bring us all the way to full civil rights.  The strong arm of
government can cope with individual acts of discrimination, injus-
tice and violence.  But in one sense, the actual infringements of civil
rights by public or private persons are only symptoms.  They reflect
the imperfections of our social order, and the ignorance and moral
weaknesses of some of our people.77
The report connected the full enjoyment of civil rights by African
Americans to shared values in society.  “We must make constructive
efforts to create an appropriate national outlook a climate of public
opinion which will outlaw individual abridgements of personal free-
dom, a climate of opinion as free from prejudice as we can make it.”78
Finally, the report called on the government to be engaged in elimi-
nating the values of racism from society.  “All of our governments,
federal, state, and local, must be uncompromising enemies of discrimi-
nation, which is prejudice come to life.”79  Additionally, governmental
efforts “must be reinforced by education—education through care-
fully planned experience, to break down the fears of groups; educa-
tion through information to dispel ignorance about our heritage and
our civil rights.”80
The cultural perspective came into sharp focus as the attack on
the separate but equal doctrine shifted from professional and graduate
education81 to elementary and secondary education.  In the lower
courts, several social scientists noted how the values transmitted in
separate but equal education negatively impacted both African Amer-
icans and Whites.  The African American children were the hardest
hit.  Social psychologist Dr. Kenneth B. Clark reported findings from
his doll test with African American children.  Dr. Clark concluded
that African American children “like other human beings who are
76. Id. at 17-79.
77. Id. at 133.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 135.
80. Id.
81. McLaurin v. Okla. State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950); Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629




subjected to an obviously inferior status in the society in which they
live, have been definitely ‘harmed’ in the development of their per-
sonalities; that the signs of instability in their personalities are clear
. . . .”82
Dr. David Krech emphasized the harmful effect of legal segrega-
tion on the community.  Dr. Krech testified:
[L]egal segregation, because it is legal, because it is obvious to eve-
ryone, gives what we call in our lingo environmental support for the
belief that [African Americans] are in some way different from and
inferior to white people, and that in turn, of course, supports and
strengthens beliefs of racial differences, of racial inferiority. . . .  Le-
gal segregation of the educational system starts this process of dif-
ferentiating the [African American] from the white at a most crucial
age.  Children, when they are beginning to form their perceptions of
people, at the very crucial age they are immediately put into the
situation which demands of them, legally, practically, that they see
[African Americans] as somehow of a different group, different be-
ing, than Whites.83
He also referenced the interconnection between legal segregation
and other beliefs and attitudes that support racial discrimination in
the community and contended that, “a child who has for ten or twelve
years lived in a community where legal segregation is practiced, fur-
thermore, in a community where other beliefs and attitudes support
racial discrimination . . . will probably never recover from whatever
harmful effect racial prejudice and discrimination can wreak.”84
Such arguments did not move lower courts to abandon the sepa-
rate but equal doctrine.85  The Delaware Court of Chancery, however,
concluded that there was “an existing and continuing violation of the
separate but equal doctrine,” which meant the plaintiff was entitled to
admission to the “[s]tate facilities which have been shown superior.”86
The district court in Brown acknowledged that legal segregation is
“usually interpreted as denoting the inferiority of the [Black] group,”
affecting the child’s motivation to learn.87  In Briggs v. Elliott, Judge J.
Waites Waring rendered a dissenting opinion in which he contended
82. LUCIUS J. BARKER & TWILEY W. BARKER, JR., FREEDOMS, COURTS, POLITICS: STUDIES
IN CIVIL LIBERTIES 140 (1965).
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 98 F. Supp. 797 (D. Kan. 1951); Briggs v. Elliott, 98 F. Supp. 529
(E.D.N.C. 1951); Belton v. Gebhart, 87 A.2d 862 (Del. Ch. 1952).
86. Belton, 87 A.2d 862.
87. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954) (citation omitted).
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that “the mere fact of segregation, itself, had a deleterious and warp-
ing effect upon the minds of children.”88  Judge Waring also noted that
“the evils of segregation and color prejudice come from early train-
ing.”89  Waring believed that the system of segregation in South Caro-
lina “must go and must go now.”90  Judge Waring was certainly out of
step with his community in South Carolina and more generally with
the South.  Eventually, Judge Waring resigned from the district court.
He had been severely criticized for earlier decisions.91  In Elmore v.
Rice,92 for example, Judge Waring disallowed South Carolina’s efforts
to circumvent Smith v. Allwight.93  Judge Waring concluded that “[i]t
is time for South Carolina to rejoin the union . . . to adopt the Ameri-
can way of conducting elections.”94
In Brown v. Board of Education, the Supreme Court gave the
cultural perspective of racism constitutional footing and force.  Chief
Justice Earl Warren refused to engage in a comparison of tangible fac-
tors under the separate but equal doctrine.  “We must look instead to
the effect of segregation itself on public education.”95  Chief Justice
Warren pointed to the role of education in the inculcating of “cultural
values, the preparing of students for professional training and in help-
ing him to adjust normally to his environment.”96  Chief Justice War-
ren then turned to the effect of separate education on the child’s
perception of herself and his place in society.  “To separate them from
others of similar age and qualifications solely because of their race
generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community
that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be
undone.”97  The Brown Court held that segregation is a denial of the
equal protection of the law.98
Chief Justice Warren employed a strategy that reserved the issu-
ing of remedial decrees for a later day.  Unlike Judge Waring, Chief
Justice Warren did not say, “[T]he system of segregation must go and
88. Briggs, 98 F. Supp. at 547.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 548.
91. BARKER & BARKER, supra note 82.
92. 72 F. Supp. 516 (E.D.S.C. 1947).
93. 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
94. Elmore, 72 F. Supp. at 528.
95. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 492 (1954).
96. Id. at 493.
97. Id. at 494.
98. Id. at 495.
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must go now.”99  Seemingly, the path-breaking character of the deci-
sion, the political climate that awaited the decision, and the complex-
ity of the task that was before the Court and America influenced
Chief Justice Warren.  Chief Justice Warren permitted widespread in-
volvement in the formulation of the remedial decree.  The Warren
Court has been taken to task for the delay in the pronouncement of
the remedy.100
The decision’s probable impact on the cultural basis of the sepa-
rate but equal doctrine might be gauged from the reaction of many to
the Brown decision.  Viewing Brown unfavorably, southern officials
and newspapers anticipated a tremendous change in the practices and
the way of life in the South.  Many southerners sensed that their way
of life no longer enjoyed constitutional support and that perhaps state
power alone was not sufficient to sustain the cultural values and atti-
tudes that gave vitality to the system of segregation.  Moreover, they
might have anticipated the heightened mobilization of African Ameri-
cans and their supporters.  Some northern newspapers termed the
Brown decision as a victory for democratic ideas and principles, sug-
gesting that the goals of liberal democracy might now point in the di-
rection of African Americans.101
Cultural change is an involved process, requiring the managing of
the process and the monitoring of results.  In Brown II, the Supreme
Court announced the how and when of the elimination of unconstitu-
tional segregation in public schools.  Speaking for a unanimous Court,
Chief Justice Warren noted that “[f]ull implementation of these con-
stitutional principles may require solution to varied local
problems.”102 Anticipating opposition, Warren said, “[I]t should go
without saying that the vitality of these constitutional principles can-
not be allowed to yield simply because of disagreement with them.”103
As noted above, Chief Justice Warren seemed to be sensitive, some
argued too sensitive, to the political climate that was integrally tied to
values, attitudes, and practices in the South, and eventually the evolu-
tion of time revealed in the North as well.104  Lower courts were given
99. Briggs v. Elliott, 98 F. Supp. 529, 548 (E.D.S.C. 1951).
100. Combs, Courts, supra note 58.
101. BARKER & BARKER, supra note 82; Arthur A. North, Desegregation: It’s Implication in
the Constitutional, Political, Legal, Economic and Sociological Spheres of Southern Life, 25
FORDHAM L. REV. 91 (1956).
102. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 299 (1955) (Brown II).
103. Id. at 300.
104. See GARY ORFIELD, MUST WE BUS? (1978); see also Combs, Courts, supra note 58.
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broad discretion in altering the segregation character of school dis-
tricts.  Lower courts were also assigned the dual role of managing and
monitoring the change.  The managing role included the consideration
of “problems related to administration, arising from the physical con-
dition of the school plant, the school transportation system, personnel,
revision of school districts and attendance areas into compact units to
achieve a system of determining admission to the public schools on a
nonracial basis . . . .”105  All of these elements were heaped in prac-
tices that reflected and symbolized the status of African Americans
and Whites.  To facilitate change, lower courts were also empowered
to bring about “revision of local laws and regulations . . . .”106  The
monitoring function of lower courts was fairly clearly defined.  “Dur-
ing this period of transition, the courts will retain jurisdiction of these
cases.”107
The “with all deliberate speed” doctrine has been a two-edged
sword.108  On the one hand, the doctrine has provided recalcitrants
time to resist steps to eliminate discriminatory practices.  The unwill-
ing employed the time to strategize to maintain the status quo or to
make minor changes in the hopes of maintaining the prevailing cul-
ture that embraced elements of racism and discrimination.  On the
other hand, the “with all deliberate speed” doctrine gave lower courts
time to assess the best plans to disestablish the segregation attitudes,
values, and practices that were, and are so imbedded in society.109  In
time, however, the Supreme Court and America discovered that time
was not the issue but willingness; the resistance of a culture that signif-
icantly opposed the recognition of the equality and personhood of Af-
rican Americans and opposed the involvement of the Supreme Court,
the federal government, and northerners in a problem of the South.110
III. BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION : THE CATALYST
FOR CULTURAL TRANSFORMATION
While the Brown decisions did not initiate the drive toward
equality and anti-discrimination,111 Brown I and II have become the
105. Brown, 349 U.S. at 300.
106. Id. at 301.
107. Id.
108. JAMES T. PATTERSON, BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION: A CIVIL RIGHTS MILESTONE
AND ITS TROUBLED LEGACY 86-117 (2001).
109. Id. at 96; JACK W. PELTASON, FIFTY-EIGHT LONELY MEN 132 (1971).
110. See PELTASON, supra note 109; Combs, Supreme Court, supra note 18.
111. ALDON MORRIS, THE ORIGIN OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT (1984).
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catalyst for the transformation of the values, attitudes, and practices
of American culture, including mobilization of political action, legal
mobilization, and alteration in perceptions and approaches.112 Brown
I and II have also changed, to some extent, the meaning and percep-
tion of what it is to be Black and White, as well as the means whereby
the racial inequalities are contested.  That is, Brown I and II have put
into place the constitutional principles of equality and anti-discrimina-
tion that have under girded and guided the general thrust of policy
that seeks to change the racist and discriminatory practices that are so
imbedded in American culture.113  For most of the history of this na-
tion, such constitutional principles had been virtually ignored by na-
tional, state, and local decision-makers; reflecting the overall
character of the system’s values.114
The import of these decisions has extended well beyond educa-
tion to include voting, employment, recreation, public accommoda-
tion, and corporate America.115  This seemingly universal extension
has restricted some of the influence of racism and discriminatory prac-
tices, values, and attitudes.  More directly, Brown and subsequent de-
cisions have given rise to what we term the culture of racial
progressive gradualism which would include the following compo-
nents: (1) the salience of societal, historical, and present-day racism in
defining and structuring the social interactions between African
Americans and Whites, as well as influencing the opportunities availa-
ble to both African Americans and Whites; (2) the necessity of an
active role of government, especially the federal government, in the
disestablishment of the values, traditions, symbols, and significations
rooted in white supremacy and segregation116—the civil rights legisla-
tion of the 1960s legitimated the posture of the Supreme Court as re-
112. CANON & JOHNSON, supra note 10; Kessler, supra note 11; ALDON MORRIS, supra note
111; see also ROSENBERG, supra note 9.
113. For a discussion of the embeddedness of racial inequities, see Feagin & Sikes, supra
note 26.
114. FRANKLIN, supra note 5; BARKER ET AL., supra note 22; Combs, Courts, supra note 58.
115. See Exec. Order No. 11, 246, 3 C.F.R. 339 § 101 (1965); MICHAEL ROSENFELD, AFFIRM-
ATIVE ACTION: A PHILOSOPHICAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL INQUIRY 160 (1991); see also ARTHUR
GUTMAN, EEO LAW AND PERSONNEL PRACTICES (2d ed. 2000).
116. White supremacy is premised on values, traditions, and symbols that maintained a hier-
archical system that shaped the life chances of Blacks and Whites.  Under the leadership of the
Supreme Court, the federal government pursued policies and programs that focused on the cul-
tural basis of White supremacy. See EDUARDO BONILLA-SILVA, WHITE SUPREMACY AND RA-
CISM IN THE POST-CIVIL RIGHTS ERA (2001).  For a discussion of White racism and dominance in
organizations, see ROBERT T. CARTER, ADDRESSING CULTURAL ISSUES IN ORGANIZATIONS: BE-
YOND THE CORPORATE CONTEXT (2000).
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flected in Brown and other decisions, requiring a pro-active federal
role; (3) the support of race conscious measures and policies to over-
come and to address the disadvantages perpetuated by the traditions,
structures, and understandings of Jim Crow and present-day discrimi-
nation; and (4) the stress of the harmful and persistent consequences
of racism and its expression on the lives of African Americans.  In
addition, the harm thesis has been at the center of the culture of racial
progressive gradualism, providing an understanding of racial discrimi-
nation and the need to eliminate racism and racial discrimination.
Gradualism tends to govern the intensity and speed of the efforts and
policies.  The Brown decisions provide the moral and constitutional
foundation for the changes that have occurred over the past fifty
years, and the Supreme Court has been in the forefront of this mam-
moth undertaking.117
In Brown I, the Supreme Court gave constitutional significance to
the “harm” thesis that was originally articulated in social science re-
search.118  Fundamentally, the harm thesis posits that discriminatory
practices not only have a detrimental impact on the minds and hearts
of African Americans and Whites, but ultimately disadvantage Afri-
can Americans in their personal development, their access to opportu-
nities and the benefits and rewards of American society, and tip the
power equation in the favor of Whites.  To some extent the “harm”
thesis connects present day racism and discrimination to the effects of
slavery and the system of segregation.119  One writer argued, “[T]he
racist presumably wants to disadvantage his victims . . . .”120
Among lower federal courts, the “harm” thesis received enor-
mous authentication.  As school desegregation unfolded, several
courts employed remedial measures that targeted the harm racist and
117. The notion of the culture of racial progressive gradualism is deduced from a number of
works. See, e.g., BARKER ET AL., supra note 24; BONILLA-SILVA, supra note 116; MICHAEL DAW-
SON, BLACK VISIONS: THE ROOTS OF CONTEMPORARY AFRICAN AMERICAN POLITICAL IDEOLO-
GIES (2001); ROCHON, supra note 12; Barker, supra note 10; Casper, supra note 8; Combs,
Courts, supra note 58; Combs, Federal Judiciary, supra note 8; see also LANI GUINIER & GERALD
TORRES, THE MINER’S CANARY: ENLISTING RACE, RESISTING POWER AND TRANSFORMING DE-
MOCRACY (2002).
118. See KENNETH B. CLARK, EFFECTS OF PREJUDICIAL AND DISCRIMINATION ON PERSON-
ALITY (MID-CENTURY WHITE HOUSE CONFERENCE ON CHILDREN AND YOUTH 1950); E. FRANK-
LIN FRAZIER, THE NEGRO IN THE UNITED STATES (1949); MYRDAL, supra note 25; Max
Deutscher & Isidor Chein, The Psychological Effects of Enforced Segregation: A Survey of Social
Science Opinion, 26 J. PSYCHOL. 259 (1949).
119. Oliver v. Kalamazoo Bd. of Educ., 368 F. Supp. 143, 154 (W.D. Mich. 1973); see also
DERRICK A. BELL JR., FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL (1992).
120. ROSENFELD, supra note 115, at 43.
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discriminatory practices had reeked on African Americans and more
generally on the African American community.121  In Oliver v.
Kalamazoo, Judge Fox argued that the “harm” perpetuated by segre-
gative conditions continues to be felt.122  He said, “[T]he context of
modern America, segregated education is detrimental to Black and
White students, creating, especially for Black students, psychological
and social difficulties which have a substantial adverse impact on
overall individual development.  Segregated education plainly denies
equal educational opportunity.”123
The harm thesis has ramifications well beyond the area of school
desegregation.  It has become, for example, a major argument in the
affirmative action debate.  Consider, for example, President Johnson’s
affirmative action policy that was significantly influenced by the harm
thesis.124  The centerpiece of Johnson’s affirmative action policy was
Executive Order 11,246, which was result-oriented.125  The Order pro-
hibited discrimination by contractors and subcontractors: (1) requiring
them to take affirmative action to make sure African Americans were
employed and treated without racial discrimination; and (2) requiring
contractors and subcontractors not to discriminate in the recruitment,
employment, promotion, demotion, and transfer of African American
employees.
In affirmative action cases before the Supreme Court, the harm
thesis gained support.126  Perhaps, the most forceful statement of the
harm thesis is found in Justice Marshall’s concurring and dissenting in
part opinion in Regents of University of California v. Bakke.127  Justice
Marshall urged:
It is unnecessary in 20th century America to have individual [Afri-
can Americans] demonstrate that they have been victims of racial
discrimination; the racism of our society has been so pervasive that
none, regardless of wealth or position, has managed to escape its
impact.  The experience of [African Americans] in America has
121. Liddell v. Missouri, 731 F.2d 1294, 1313 (8th Cir. 1984); Oliver v. Mich. State Bd., 508
F.2d 178, 183 (6th Cir. 1974); Bradley v. Milliken, 402 F. Supp. 1096, 1101 (E.D. Mich. 1975).
122. Oliver, 368 F. Supp. at 143.
123. Id. at 156; see also Bradley v. Milliken, 433 U.S. 267 (1977) (Milliken II).
124. See Combs, Courts, supra note 58.
125. Exec. Order 11,246, 30 Fed. Reg. 12,319 (Sept. 24, 1965).
126. See, e.g., United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149 (1987); Firefighters v. City of Cleve-
land, 478 U.S. 501 (1986); Sheet Metal Workers v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421 (1986); United States
Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979); cf. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S.
469 (1989); Firefighters v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561 (1984).
127. 438 U.S. 265, 387 (1987) (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.).
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been different in kind, not just in degree, from that of other ethnic
groups.  It is not merely the history of slavery alone but also that a
whole people were marked as inferior by law.  And that mark has
endured.  The dream of America as the great melting pot has not
been realized for the [Black]; because of his skin color he never
even made it into the pot.128
The harm thesis has become widely accepted throughout the
American society.129  The harm thesis demands more than the repeal
or removal of state-supported barriers.  But rather, it demands deci-
sive action that would eliminate racism and discriminatory practices
that perpetuate inequalities.
In Brown I and II, additionally, the Supreme Court subscribed to
the eradication of racism.130  The principal agency of eradication was
the power and authority of government, especially the Federal gov-
ernment.  As noted above, the Truman Administration’s report, To
Secure These Rights, proposed the eradication of racism, but the re-
port carried neither the authority of law nor the force of the Constitu-
tion.  The report looked to voluntary action and the bully pulpit of the
President.131  In Brown I and II, the Supreme Court assumed that vol-
untary efforts alone would not alter the system of segregation that
espoused values and practices that severely hindered the lives of Afri-
can American children.  In Brown I, Chief Justice Warren’s citation of
the Kansas and Delaware cases clearly demonstrates that “the mere
increase in funding for African American students would not meet the
newly announced constitutional standard for equal educational oppor-
tunities.132 Brown II speaks of the “elimination of a variety of obsta-
cles in making the transition to school operated in accordance with the
constitutional principles set forth in [Brown I].”133 Brown II also
speaks of the “systematic and effective” removal of obstacles.  While
school boards put forth voluntary plans and lower courts accepted
them, after fourteen years of voluntary plans, the Supreme Court de-
manded plans that placed an affirmative duty on school officials.  The
128. Id. at 400-01.
129. The harm of racism and discrimination is discussed in the areas of school desegregation,
affirmative action, and the debate of mutliculturalism.
130. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (Brown I); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S.
294 (1955) (Brown II).
131. TO SECURE THESE RIGHTS, supra note 65.
132. Brown, 347 U.S. at 492.  Chief Justice Warren rejected the equalization of buildings,
curricula, qualifications, and salaries of teachers.  Warren argued, “[W]e must look instead to the
effect of segregation itself on public education.” Id.
133. Brown, 349 U.S. at 300.
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desegregation of Central High School of Little Rock, Arkansas wit-
nessed a change in the view of President Eisenhower who abandoned
his moderate approach to school desegregation and civil rights, dis-
patching federal troops to stop the violence and the threat of violence
at the school.134  In Cooper v. Aaron, the Supreme Court refused to
relent, declaring that that the Court would not permit the postpone-
ment of court decrees in the face of threatened or actual violence.135
In Green v. County School Board of New Kent County, Virginia, Jus-
tice Brennan pointed out that the goal was the “transition to a unitary,
nonracial system of public education . . . .”136  Justice Brennan ad-
judged that school officials were “charged with the affirmative duty to
take whatever steps might be necessary to convert to a unitary system
in which racial discrimination would be eliminated root and
branch.”137  The eradication of racism is a concept that is now diffused
throughout the American society.  However, as we shall see below,
the Supreme Court and other decision makers and participants in
politics have dealt a powerful blow to the concept, retreating from the
notion of eliminating racism.138
IV. BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND THE 1964
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION: THE MAKING OF
THE COUNTER-CULTURE OF RACIAL
DIVERSIONARY STANDPATISM
In July of 1964, the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 repre-
sented the triumph of Brown v. Board of Education.139  Now the Pres-
ident and Congress had squarely joined the Supreme Court in the
imposition of government power, especially the federal government,
to transform the nation from the culture of Jim Crow to the culture of
racial progressivism.  Under Jim Crow, the values of White supremacy
and segregation effectively denied political, economic, and personal
power to African Americans.  Segregation and the powerless scope of
interactions between African Americans and Whites reinforced the
values, beliefs, and significations of White supremacy.140  The culture
134. Combs, Courts, supra note 58, at 293-95, 297-310.
135. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 16 (1958).
136. 391 U.S. 430, 436 (1968).
137. Id. at 437-38.
138. Combs, Courts, supra note 58.
139. LINO A. GRAGLIA, DISASTER BY DECREE: SUPREME COURT ON RACE AND THE
SCHOOLS (1976); Combs, Courts, supra note 58.
140. See infra notes 150-51.
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of racial progressive gradualism emphasized: (1) the salience of socie-
tal, historical, and present-day racism and discrimination in shaping
the interactions between African Americans and Whites at all levels;
(2) the necessity of an active role of the government, especially the
federal government, in the disestablishment of the values of racism
premised on white supremacy and segregation; (3) the employment of
race conscious measures and terminology to describe and address the
removal of the values and significations, and traditions that disadvan-
taged blacks; and (4) the emphasis on the harmful and persistent con-
sequences of racism and its expressions on the lives of African
Americans.
However, the triumph of Brown was met with a counter-culture
movement fueled by the presidential campaign of Senator Barry
Goldwater.141  Even prior to the passage of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, cultural opposition existed, seeking to blunt or to overturn the
Brown decision.  The manifestation of the opposition was expressed
variously (such as the Southern Manifesto, the brutality of local police
forces, the threat of violence, terrorism, and the enactment of segrega-
tion laws).142  These were all efforts to maintain the value system of
White supremacy and segregation, or to keep African Americans po-
litically, economically, legally, and symbolically powerless.  Geertz,
among others, suggests that cultural changes are met with efforts to
maintain present or existent values, practices, and signification.143
The same holds true for Brown v. Board of Education.
Increasingly, however, the exponents of the counter-culture
found it difficult to make overt appeals to segregationist sentiments
and still remain credible participants in the body politics.144 Brown
transformed the dialogue on race and spurned definitive shifts in the
political and cultural movement that opponents risked being per-
ceived as anti-Black and pro-White supremacy.145
141. DONALD R. KINDER & LYNN M. SANDER, DIVIDED BY COLOR (1996); RICHARD H.
ROVERE, THE GOLDWATER CAPER (1965).
142. PATTERSON, supra note 108, at 86-117.
143. GEERTZ, supra note 14; HUNTER, supra note 11.
144. Jerry Himelstein, Rhetorical Continutities in the Politics of Race: The Closed Society Re-
visited, 48 S. SPEECH COMM. J. 153 (1983).  For a discussion of cultural reinforcement of beliefs,
see ROCHON, supra note 12; Ann Swidler, Culture in Action: Symbols and Strategies, 51 AM. SOC.
REV. 273 (1986).
145. EARL BLACK & MERLE BLACK, POLITICS AND SOCIETY IN THE SOUTH (1987) [hereinaf-
ter BLACK & BLACK, POLITICS]; EARL BLACK & MERLE BLACK, THE VITAL SOUTH: HOW PRES-
IDENTS ARE ELECTED (1992) [hereinafter BLACK & BLACK, VITAL SOUTH]; BONILLA-SILVA,
supra note 116; KINDER & SANDER, supra note 141.
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The opponents of the egalitarian principle and the approach of
Brown and its triumph in the Civil Rights Act of 1964 confronted the
need to alter their strategies and agency of articulation.146  From 1960-
1964, both the Democrat and Republican parties were committed to a
civil rights agenda that would ultimately reconfigure the power ratio
between African Americans and Whites at several levels, including
the electoral process, the distribution of jobs and opportunities, the
impact of racist values and institutions on the lives of African Ameri-
cans, and altering America’s public view of African Americans and
race.147  With the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, however,
the Democratic Party effectively became the Pro-Civil Rights Party.
Additionally, the Republican Party, under the dominance of northeas-
terners, joined with the Democratic Party to secure passage of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964.  African Americans flocked to the Demo-
cratic Party in unprecedented numbers, while many White
southerners believed the Democrats had left them and actively at-
tacked their values, attitudes, symbols, significations, and way of
life.148
The presidential election of 1964 brought into sharp focus the re-
lationship between culture and electoral politics.149  What a number of
White southerners lost with the pro-civil rights posture of the Demo-
cratic Party, they gained in the ideological candidacy of Senator Barry
Goldwater, the Republican Party’s standard-bearer.  Goldwater and
conservatives dislodged northerners from dominance in the Republi-
can Party.150  The centerpiece of Goldwater’s conservativism was
states’ rights and a strict constructionist understanding of the Consti-
tution.151  For Goldwater, “the whole contemporary concept of ‘civil
rights’ [was] constitutionally invalid,” and there is only “an imagined
conflict” between states’ rights and civil rights.152  The value of states’
146. See BARKER ET AL., supra note 22; PARSONS, supra note 14; C. WRIGHT MILLS, supra
note 22.  For the discussion of the relationship between culture and politics, see HUNTER, supra
note 11.
147. BLACK & BLACK, POLITICS, supra note 145; BLACK & BLACK, VITAL SOUTH, supra note
145; KINDER & SANDER, supra note 141; ROVERE, supra note 141; Philip E. Converse et al.,
Electoral Myth and Reality: The 1964 Election, 59 AM. POL SCI. REV. 321 (1965).
148. Converse et al., supra note 147.
149. For a discussion of the relationship between culture and politics, see HUNTER, supra
note 11.
150. BLACK & BLACK, POLITICS, supra note 145; BLACK & BLACK, VITAL SOUTH, supra note
145; ROVERE, supra note 141; Converse et. al., supra note 147.
151. EDWARD G. CARMINES & JAMES A. STIMSON, ISSUE EVOLUTION: RACE AND THE
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN POLITICS (1989); ROVERE, supra note 141.
152. ROVERE, supra note 141, at 49.
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rights has been a rally cry in the South since the 1830s as a justification
for the institution of slavery and the disallowance of federal interven-
tion in protecting the rights of African Americans.  States’ rights is
deeply embedded in the culture of the political and social culture of
America.  The Brown decision and its embrace by Congress and the
President, in the Civil Rights Act of 1964 were, in the mind of many in
the South, a clear violation of the doctrine of states’ rights.
The Goldwater candidacy also appealed to some who desired the
rigid separation of African Americans and Whites and the social, po-
litical, and legal values that empowered Whites and disempowered
African Americans, returning the South and the nation to their pre-
Brown patterns of racial interactions.153  Goldwater employed a strat-
egy that made the South a fulcrum for victory, which called for the
reorganization of American politics.  The campaign reasoned that the
“South had no reason to be a Democratic bastion; by all of its affini-
ties and traditions, it should long since have become Republican.”154
The strategy tapped into the mounting “White backlash” that
emerged in response to the civil rights thrust of the Kennedy and
Johnson administrations, and “the increased signs of [Black] un-
rest.”155  Additionally, Goldwater proved his colors with a vote
against the civil rights legislation of 1964, representing “no condoning
of segregation per se, but rather a blow for states’ rights against the
encroachment of the federal government.”156  The central thrust of
the strategy was the provision of a clear party differentiation on civil
rights at the national level.  The Republican Party became the party of
individualism, and the Democratic Party became the party of equality.
The Republican Party became the party of racial conservativism, and
the Democratic became the party of racial liberalism.  The Republican
Party became the party that appealed to supporters of White
supremacy and segregation, becoming the “White man” party.  The
Democratic Party became the party that appealed to supporters of
desegregation, becoming the pro-civil rights party.157
Using code words, Goldwater pitched his message on the cam-
paign trail.  A code word “is a word or phrase which communicates a
well understood but implicit meaning to part of a public audience
153. Converse et al., supra note 147.
154. Id. at 327.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 328.
157. BLACK & BLACK, POLITICS, supra note 145; BLACK & BLACK, VITAL SOUTH, supra note
145; CARMINES & STIMSON, supra note 151.
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while preserving for the speaker deniability of that meaning by refer-
ence to its denotative explicit meaning.”158  Senator Barry Goldwa-
ter’s speeches were tailored to tap, among other things, White
resentment and dislike for an active role of the federal government in
the pursuit of equality for African Americans.  “[C]ertainly, no level
of government can or should attempt by its actions to enforce equality
in those essentially personal areas of great human differences.  It is
such differences that give life to diversity and man his wondrous vari-
ety.”159  He supported segregation and opposition to Brown by ap-
pealing to God and nature:
[W]here government presumes to control equality, forgetting that in
its essential areas it lies within God’s province and laws of nature,
there can be only conformity.  Government must consider and trust
all men as equal in the areas of law and civic order.  Otherwise, and
in no other area, can it make men equal.160
Words are very important in the political culture of America,
gaining advantage and manipulating public opinion.161  Senator Gold-
water initiated the shift from the horrors and iniquities of segregation
and racism to the proper role of the federal government in the strug-
gle to break the traditions of discrimination against African
Americans.
Although Goldwater never mentioned “race,” “African Ameri-
cans,” “Whites,” or “segregation,” one commentator, Richard H.
Rovere contended, “[Goldwater] talked about them all the time in an
underground, or Aesopian, language—a kind of code that few in his
audience had any trouble deciphering.”162 Rovere further insisted,
“[In the code], ‘bullies and marauders’ means [‘African Americans’].
‘Criminal defendants’ means [‘African Americans’].  ‘States’ rights’
means ‘opposition to civil rights’. . . .  ‘Federal judiciary’ means ‘inte-
grationist judges.’”163  Goldwater appealed to the distorted images of
African Americans that are embedded in the culture dominated by
the beliefs of White supremacy and segregation.  The Goldwater
movement in the South “appeared to be a racist movement and very
158. KINDER & SANDERS, supra note 141; DANIEL T. RODGERS, CONTESTED TRUTHS:
KEYWORDS IN AMERICAN POLITICS SINCE INDEPENDENCE (1987); Himelstein, supra note 144, at
156.
159. Senator Barry Goldwater, Speech at the Conrad Hilton Hotel, Chicago, Ill. (Oct. 16,
1964).
160. Id.; ROVERE, supra note 141, at 143.
161. RODGERS, supra note 158.




little else.  Goldwater seemed fully aware of this and not visibly dis-
tressed by it.”164
On balance, the 1964 Goldwater presidential candidacy legiti-
mated and augmented the cultural-political opposition to the Brown
culture that empowered African Americans to some extent and in
some ways. Brown stood for the prohibition of segregation, the prohi-
bition of the continuation of White supremacy as a cultural value that
shaped the lives of African Americans at assorted levels, and the im-
position of government power, especially federal power, to break
down the consequences of Plessy and Jim Crow.  Goldwater, however,
could “not bring himself to support the objective of a desegregated
society.”165  In his speeches, Goldwater made it clear that segregation
and integration ought to be given equal weight before the Constitu-
tion: “To me,” Goldwater argued, “it is wrong to take some children
out of schools they would normally attend and bus them to others just
to get a mixture of ethnic and racial groups that somebody thinks is
desirable.  This forced integration is just as wrong as forced
segregation.”166
Goldwater elevated opposition to Brown from the level of anti-
Black to that of legitimate opposition to an overly intrusive federal
government that compromises the cultural traditions of the nation and
the region of the South.  Carmines and Stimson advance a persuasive
argument that assesses the salience of the 1964 presidential election:
The 1964 presidential election thus marked the decisive turning
point in the political evolution of racial issues. With the nomination
of Goldwater the Republican Party – the party of Lincoln and
emancipation – turned its back on one hundred years of racial pro-
gressivism and instead undertook a strategy designed to attract the
support of racially disaffected Democrats.167
The elements of the Goldwater strategy continue to guide or at
least inform the strategy of the Republican Party.  On racial issues,
every Republican candidate for the presidency has been significantly
more conservative than their Democratic counterparts.168  In 1968, for
164. Id.; CARMINES & STIMSON, supra note 151, at 47.
165. BARKER ET AL., supra note 22; BLACK & BLACK, POLITICS, supra note 145; BLACK &
BLACK, VITAL SOUTH, supra note 145, at 152.
166. Goldwater, supra note 159, at 143.
167. CARMINES & STIMSON, supra note 151, at 47.  For a general discussion of the agency of
ideas and ideology, see MILLS, supra note 22.
168. MILLS, supra note 22; see also BARKER ET AL., supra note 22; BLACK & BLACK, POLIT-
ICS, supra note 145; BLACK & BLACK, VITAL SOUTH, supra note 145.
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example, Nixon “pursued a course of action on racial issues that had
great appeal to white southerners.”169  In fast order, the victorious
Nixon nominated four conservatives to the Supreme Court: Chief Jus-
tice Warren E. Burger (1969); Harry A. Blackmun (1970); Lewis
Franklin Powell (1972); and William H. Rehnquist (1972).  Each pos-
sessed conservative credentials.  Finally, the 1964 presidential candi-
dacy of Goldwater established the Republican Party as the agency
that embraced White supremacy, segregation, and racial
conservativism.170
We have categorized the counter culture to Brown the culture of
racial diversionary standpatism which possesses the following ele-
ments: (1) a minimalist approach to Federal power to eliminate racism
and racial discrimination (There is an enormous faith and commit-
ment to the invisible hand or market approach to racism and discrimi-
nation.  Race is largely perceived as a local issue rather than a
national one, and is more amiable to local solutions); (2) a conciliatory
disposition to the racial views and status of southerners and Whites on
the whole (A greater sympathy exists for southerners and Whites’ ra-
cial situation than for the racial discrimination that defines the cul-
tural and political status of African Americans.171  There is an
enormous emphasis on the cost of eliminating racial discrimination in
policies, procedures, and structures of the system); (3) the move from
the biological inferiority of African Americans to the biologization of
culture172 (The assumption is that the culture of African Americans is
inferior to that of Whites.  Prior to Brown, the central thrust of racism
pivoted on the biological inferiority of African Americans, meaning
white people were naturally perceived to be superior and whiteness
was the basis of evaluation.  White superiority became the justification
for the power and advantages of Whites.  The biologization of culture
is a post-Brown rationalization that “allows Whites to express resent-
ment and hostility safely since, in their view, African Americans are
where they are as a group because they do not want to get ahead”)173;
and (4) the avoidance of any direct reference to race or the abandon-
ment of racial terminology in the discussion of racism and racial dis-
crimination.174  Racial issues are discussed in terms of the intervention
169. CARMINE & STIMSON, supra note 151, at 53.
170. For a discussion of the agency of ideas and ideology, see MILLS, supra note 22.
171. BONILLA-SILVA, supra note 116, at 248.
172. Id.; see MYDRAL, supra note 25.
173. BONILLA-SILVA, supra note 116, at 248; see Combs, Courts, supra note 58.
174. Combs, Courts, supra note 58.
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of the federal government, individualism, personal responsibility and
a historical context.  Under the culture of racial diversionary standpat-
ism, the built-in tension between the values of individualism and
equality is resolved on the side of individualism.  Additionally, the
harm of racism and racial discrimination against African Americans is
severely ignored or discounted.
Unlike the culture of racial progressive gradualism supported in
Brown, the culture of racial diversionary standpatism is not far re-
moved from the period of unbridled segregation and White
supremacy.175  This perspective enforces the claims and the racial ar-
rangements that existed prior to Brown, supporting the status quo on
race.  On balance, the consequences of the Goldwater campaign stand
in contrast to the principles and approach propagated in Brown.
Goldwater legitimated cultural opposition to Brown and provided the
agency to advance that opposition.
V. BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION IN THE ERA OF
THE CULTURE OF RACIAL DIVERSIONARY STANDPATISM
Since May 17, 1954, Brown v. Board of Education has been at
center stage in the cultural war over race.  In Brown, the Supreme
Court ushered in the culture of racial progressive gradualism, altering
how the values of individualism and equality would inform the inter-
actions of African Americans and Whites. Brown summoned a deci-
sive role on the part of the government in structuring ideas, beliefs,
and values as to how African Americans would be seen and treated.
Contrary to conventional wisdom, government was at the center of
the culture of Jim Crow (such as state statutes that required the sepa-
ration of races; the litany of Supreme Court decisions that legitimated
the separation of the races; the federal government’s enormous role in
the creation and preservation of the system of separation in housing,
employment and voting and countless local government laws).176
Brown’s culture of racial progressive gradualism encountered an
empowered culture of racial diversionary standpatism that emerged in
the 1960s.177  The 1968 victory of Richard Nixon meant that the bal-
175. Id.; see MYDRAL, supra note 25.
176. Combs, Courts, supra note 58.
177. The culture of racial diversionary standpatism describes the culture system that
emerged in opposition to Brown v. Board of Education and its culture of racial progressive
gradualism.  The culture of racial diversionary standpatism de-emphasizes the salience and im-
pact of racism and discrimination on the political, legal, economic, social, and educational status
of African Americans.  The effort is also to greatly limit the role of the federal government as an
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ance of power had shifted.  During his first term, President Nixon ap-
pointed four justices to the Supreme Court who possessed
conservative credentials.  Subsequently, the Supreme Court gradually
abandoned the racial progressive gradualism championed in Brown
and the civil rights legislation of the 1960s.  The racial policy that ema-
nated from the Supreme Court bears several of the characteristics of
the culture of racial diversionary standpatism: (1) a minimalization of
government power, especially the Federal government, in the arena of
race; (2) a conciliatory disposition to the racial views and situation of
Whites on race and a stress on the cost of the effort of the elimination
of racial inequalities to the system; (3) an avoidance of direct refer-
ence to race or the usage of racial terminology and approaches in the
formulation of public policy that govern or impact the interactions be-
tween African Americans and Whites and that shape the opportuni-
ties of African Americans; and (4) a focus on the harmful and persist
consequences of racism and its manifestation on and in the lives of
African Americans.
A. The Minimalization of Government Power
Since the late 1960s, the tenor of racial policy reflects the
minimalization of government power to alter the social, political, eco-
nomic, and legal status of African Americans.  The minimalization of
government power often works to promote entrenched interests and
retard the movement to address entrenched inequalities that results
from racial discrimination and the various forms of racism.  The Su-
preme Court has been at the forefront in this movement.  While the
Court participation has not been linear, nevertheless, the Supreme
Court has established standards and doctrines that restrict the imple-
mentation and force of the principles of Brown and legislation enacted
to sustain those principles.
B. From Discriminatory Effect to Discriminatory Purpose
A key element of the minimalization of the usage of government
power has been the shift from the effect test to the purpose test in the
establishment of violations of the Constitution and certain provisions
agent in the eradication of racism and discrimination against African Americans.  Finally, the
culture of diversionary standpatism has, seemingly, supplanted the value of White supremacy
and subscribes to the legitimacy of White privilege.
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of the civil rights legislation of the 1960s.178  Initially, the Supreme
Court demonstrated a reluctance to impose discriminatory purpose or
intent.  In Griggs v. Duke Power Co., the Supreme Court issued the
requirements mandated under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964.179  Speaking for a unanimous Court, Chief Justice Burger argued
that Congress required “the removal of artificial, arbitrary, and unnec-
essary barriers to employment when the barriers operate invidiously
to discriminate on the basis of racial or other impermissible classifica-
tion.”  Employing an effect standard, Burger held that “the touch-
stone is business necessity,”180 and argued that “good intent or
absence of discriminatory intent does not redeem employment proce-
dures or testing mechanisms that operate as ‘built-in head winds’ for
minority groups and are unrelated to measuring job capability.”181
However, in Palmer v. Thompson, the Supreme Court disallowed the
permissibility of the purpose test in deciding whether the City of Jack-
son, Mississippi unconstitutionally closed the city’s swimming pool for
financial reasons after being ordered to integrate by a federal court.182
Speaking for the Court, Justice Black claimed, “No case in this Court
has held that a legislative act may violate equal protection solely be-
cause of the motivations of the men who voted for it.”183  In his dis-
sent, Justice Douglas argued that the closing of the city swimming was
“at least in part racially motivated.”184  He refused to argue for a
purely discriminatory purpose as grounds for the case.  Justice Doug-
las noted that the “question for the federal judiciary is not what the
motive was, but what the consequences [effects] are.”185  Justice
Douglas concluded neither the state nor its subdivisions may eliminate
services “for the purpose of perpetuating or install apartheid or be-
cause it finds life in a multi-racial community difficult or
unpleasant.”186
As the support for the culture of racial diversionary standpatism
increased on the Supreme Court, the Court gradually, but persistently,
178. John Hart Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79
YALE L.J. 1205 (1970); Note, Legislative Purpose and Federal Constitutional Adjudication, 83
HARV. L. REV. 1887 (1970).
179. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2002).
180. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
181. Id. at 432.
182. Palmer v. Thompson, 401 U.S. 217 (1971).
183. Id. at 224.
184. Id. at 235.
185. Id. at 236.
186. Id. at 238.
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endorsed the permissibility of the purpose or intent standard.  Dis-
criminatory purpose became the distinguishing characteristic of de
jure and de facto segregation in the context of northern school deseg-
regation.  In Keyes v. School District No. 1, Justice Brennan wrote:
[W]here plaintiffs prove that the school authorities have carried out
a systematic program of segregation affecting a substantial portion
of the students, schools, teachers, and facilities within the school
system, it is only common sense to conclude that there exists a pred-
icate for a finding of the existence of a dual school system.187
However, concurring in part and dissenting in part, Justice Pow-
ell, an apologist for the South, disagreed, intimating that segregation
in the North does not differ from that of the South which requires a
national constitutional standard.  Justice Powell termed tortuous the
“effort of identifying ‘segregative acts’ and deducing ‘segregative
intent.’”188
The establishment of proof of purposeful discrimination is decid-
edly more difficult than that of discriminatory effect or impact, sepa-
rating instances in which the equity power of federal courts can be
invoked.  The equity power of federal courts can only be invoked to
remedy a constitutional violation.189  Without the proof of purpose
there is no constitutional violation, meaning that the presence of dis-
criminatory effect does not substantiate a violation.  This is illustrated
in Milliken v. Bradley.190  Both the District Court and the Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit advanced a multi-district remedy to de-
segregate the schools of Detroit.  Writing for a divided Court, Chief
Justice Warren E. Burger disallowed the imposition of a metropolitan
desegregation plan.  Chiding the lower courts, Chief Justice Burger
questioned the capacity of a district court judge to administer fifty-
four school districts, and championed the “people control of schools
throughout their elected representatives.”191  Chief Justice Burger
argued,
Before the boundaries of separate and autonomous school districts
may be set aside by consolidating the separate units for remedial
purposes or by imposing a cross-district remedy, it must first be
shown that there has been a constitutional violation within one dis-
trict that produces a significant segregative effect in another district.
187. Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 201 (1973).
188. Id. at 224 (Powell, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
189. Swan v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
190. 418 U.S. 744-45 (1974).
191. Id. at 744.
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Specifically, it must be shown that racial discriminatory acts of the
state or local school districts, or of a single school district has been a
substantial cause of interdistrict segregation.192
The dissenters took the majority to task.  Justice Douglas placed
the disallowance of the metropolitan plan in the context of the willing-
ness of the society to grapple with the problem of race.  “When we
rule against the metropolitan area remedy we take a step that will
likely put the problems of the [African Americans] and our society
back to the period that antedated the ‘separate but equal’ regime of
Plessy v. Ferguson.”193
The dissent of Justice Marshall argued that the majority was sur-
rendering to political difficulties, suggesting that the Detroit-only rem-
edy constituted a missed opportunity to overcome the barriers of
equal opportunity and an open society.  “We deal here with the right
of all of our children,” contended Justice Marshall, “whatever their
race, to an equal start in life and to an equal opportunity to reach their
full potential as citizens.  Those children who have been denied that
right in the past deserve better than to see fences thrown up to deny
them that right in the future.”194  Justice Marshall continued, “Our
Nation, I fear, will be ill served by the Court’s refusal to remedy sepa-
rate and unequal education, for unless our children begin to learn to-
gether, there is little hope that our people will ever learn to live
together.”195
The purpose standard was also applied in other areas with the
direct consequence of minimalizing the exercise and the reach of gov-
ernment power to remove barriers, processes, and structures that pro-
moted the exclusion of African Americans.196  In Washington v. Davis,
for example, two Black applicants to become police officers in the
District of Columbia alleged that the police department’s recruiting
procedures, including written personnel tests were racially discrimina-
tory and violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.197
Speaking for the majority, Justice White distinguished the standard of
Title VII from that of the equal protection component of the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the Equal Protection
192. Id. at 744-45.
193. Id. at 759 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
194. Id. at 783.
195. Id.
196. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Antonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989); City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446
U.S. 55 (1980); Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
197. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
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Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.198  Title VII demands an effect
standard, and the Constitution requires proof of discriminatory pur-
pose.  The Davis Court explicitly placed the purpose test on constitu-
tional footing.  Justice White argued, “Disproportionate impact is not
irrelevant, but it is not the sole touchstone of an invidious racial dis-
crimination forbidden by the Constitution.  Standing alone, it does not
trigger the rule . . . .”199  Also, in City of Mobile v. Bolden, the Su-
preme Court continued to rely on the exacting standard, which re-
quired proof of discriminatory purpose to establish a violation of the
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments and the Voting Rights Act of
1965.200  The City of Mobile had a Black population of forty percent,
but no Black had ever been elected to the city’s three-member city
commission.  The district court held that the at-large election system
discriminated against African Americans.  Speaking for the majority,
Justice Powell reversed, noting that the at-large election system was
established in the early years of the twentieth century by the Progres-
sives.  The purpose was not to discriminate against African Ameri-
cans.  In 1982, however, Congress established the effect standard
when it extended the Voting Rights Act of 1982.201  The effect stan-
dard was sustained in Thornburg v. Gingles.202  The at-large system
minimized the opportunities of African Americans to win electoral
positions.
C. The Good Faith Standard
For nearly forty years, the Supreme Court and lower courts have
grappled with school desegregation decrees.  Education has been one
of the chief means to alter the culture of racism in America.  Through
the orders of federal courts, the government has played a decisive
role.  In the early 1990s, the Supreme Court backed away from the
affirmative duty of Brown and Green.203  In Green v. County School
Board of New Kent County, the Supreme Court gave constitutional
support to the principle that school officials possessed an affirmative
198. Id. at 238-39.
199. Id. at 242.
200. Voting Rights Amendment of 1982, 42 U.S.C. § 1971 (1982).
201. City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980).
202. 478 U.S. 30 (1986).
203. See ERICA FRANKENBERG ET AL., A MUTLIRACIAL SOCIETY WITH SEGREGATED
SCHOOLS: ARE WE LOSING THE DREAM? (2003), available at http//:www.civilrightsproject.
harvard.edu/research/reseg03/AreWeLosingtheDream; see also Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467
(1992); Bd. of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237 (1991); Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33 (1990).
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duty to transform dual school systems into a unitary school system.204
Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Brennan adjudged, “School
boards . . . operating state-compelled dual systems were . . . charged
with the affirmative duty to take whatever steps might be necessary to
convert to a unitary system in which racial discrimination would be
eliminated root and branch.”205  The affirmative duty standard came
under attack.  In the 1990s, the good faith standard became the con-
trolling doctrine as to whether or not district courts relinquished their
supervision of school districts found in violation of the principles of
Brown.
At issue in Board of Education of Oklahoma v. Dowell was
whether the Board of Education of Oklahoma City was entitled to
dissolution of a desegregation decree entered by the district court.  Ig-
noring the thirty years of intransigence by the board of education,
Chief Justice Rehnquist and the majority held that the board was enti-
tled to relief.  The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit concluded
the board had the “affirmative duty . . . not to take any action that
would impede the process of disestablishing the dual system and its
effects.”206  Chief Justice Rehnquist insisted, “[I]t is a mistake to treat
words such as ‘dual’ and ‘unitary’ as if they were actually found in the
Constitution,”207 abandoning the Green standard.  Rehnquist offered
a more relaxed or less demanding standard.  He directed the district
court to “address itself [as] to whether the Board had complied in
good faith with the desegregation decree since it was entered, and
whether the vestiges of past discrimination had been eliminated to the
extent practicable.”208  The effects of the good faith standard have
been immediate and widespread.  During the latter part of the 1990s,
Black re-segregation in schools occurred in all but two states, Michi-
gan and New Jersey.  These two states were already highly segregated.
In many of the states, school districts under long running desegrega-
tion decrees were relieved of the supervision of Federal courts.209
The purpose and good faith standards constitute the minimaliza-
tion of government power, especially the federal government.  The
distribution of power favored those alleged to have violated or ex-
cluded African Americans from certain benefits.  In Detroit, for ex-
204. Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
205. Id. at 437-38.
206. Bd. of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 234 (1991).
207. Id. at 245.
208. Id. at 249-50.
209. FRANKENBERG ET AL., supra note 202.
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ample, Black children and parents were denied access to equality of
education, and the state of Michigan was spared the responsibility and
the burden of creating a desegregated school system.210 Government
power is essential for the cultural transformation of the American
Society.
D. A Conciliatory Disposition to the Views of Whites on Race/
Cost to the System
The culture of racial diversionary standpatism is also defined by a
conciliatory disposition to the views of Whites and emphasis on the
cost of the elimination of racism and racial discrimination to the struc-
ture of government and established processes and arrangements.  That
is, decision-makers approach the elimination of racially imposed ineq-
uities and disadvantages with undue concern for the inconveniences
visited upon Whites and the cost to the system.  The decisions of the
Supreme Court are fertile grounds, for examples.  As the conflict over
school desegregation moved north of the Mason-Dixon line, the Su-
preme Court, as well as Congress and the President, became more
antagonistic toward the policy.
In Milliken v. Bradley, for example, Justice Marshall chided the
Court for being overly sensitive to the political winds.211  Nationally,
many suburbanites had fled cities to escape living next door and hav-
ing their children sitting next to African Americans in school.  Chief
Justice Burger voided the inter-district remedy, asserting, “[N]o single
tradition in public education is more deeply rooted than local control
over the operation of schools; local autonomy has long been thought
essential both to the maintenance of community concern and the sup-
port for public schools and to quality of the educational process.”212
Justice Marshall countered with greater emphasis on the viewpoint of
the African American students, stressing the goals of equality rather
than administrative convenience or the tradition of local control of
education.  “[African American] students will continue to perceive
their schools as segregated educational facilities and this perception
will only be increased,” retorted Marshall, “when Whites react to a
Detroit-only decree by fleeing to the suburbs to avoid integration.”213
Marshall stressed, “It will be of scant significance to [African Ameri-
210. Id. at 48.
211. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 814 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
212. Id. at 741-42.
213. Id. at 805.
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can] children who have for years been confined by de jure acts of seg-
regation to a growing core of all [African American] schools
surrounded by a ring of all-white schools that the new dividing line
between the races is the school district boundary.”214  Chief Justice
Burger never referenced how local control of schools and the educa-
tional processes supported segregation and re-enforced negative
images of African Americans.
The conciliatory element of the culture of standpatism is quite
evident in McCleskey v. Kemp and Bush v. Gore.215  In McCleskey, a
Black man sentenced to death employed the Baldus study to allege
that the administration of the Georgia capital punishment system vio-
lated the Equal Protection of the Fourteenth Amendment.216  Since
Furman v. Georgia, the existence of racism in the imposition of the
death penalty has been a fundamental and persistent argument against
the permissibility of capital punishment under the Constitution.217
The Baldus study reported that the race of the victim was one of the
factors that was decisive in the system’s imposition of the death pen-
alty.  Speaking for a sharply divided Court, Justice Powell based the
majority’s rejection of McCleskey’s petition on four factors: (1) the
desire to encourage sentencing discretion; (2) the presence of statu-
tory safeguards in the George death penalty system; (3) the fear of
encouraging widespread challenges to other areas of sentencing; and
(4) the proper role of the judiciary.  Factor three supports the concilia-
tory element of the culture of racial diversionary standpatism.  More
directly, the elimination of racism and discrimination is weighed
against the cost or disruption of the system.  Justice Powell intimated
as much when he said, “McCleskey statistical proffer must be viewed
in the context of his challenge.  McCleskey challenges decisions at the
heart of the State’s criminal justice system.”218  In his conclusion, Pow-
ell reiterated the majority’s concern for the cost that McCleskey’s
claim of racism and discrimination posed for the system.  “Thus, if we
accept McCleskey’s claim that racial bias has impermissibly tainted
the capital sentencing decision, we could soon be faced with similar
claims as to other types of penalty.”219  “Moreover, the claim that his
sentence rests on the irrelevant factor of race,” Justice Powell claimed,
214. Id.
215. McClesky v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987); Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
216. McClesky, 481 U.S. at 283.
217. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
218. McClesky, 481 U.S. at 297.
219. Id. at 315.
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“easily could be extended to apply to claims based on unexplained
discrepancies that correlate to membership in other minority groups,
and even to gender.”220
A more recent example from the Supreme Court will conclude
our discussion of the conciliatory disposition to Whites or to the cost
to the system.  In Bush v. Gore, the Supreme Court effectively de-
cided the Presidential Election of 2000.  The presidential vote in Flor-
ida was laden with controversy, including racial discrimination at
polling places, intimidation of Black voters by police officers, and the
removal of Black voters from the state voter rolls.221  It has also been
reported that one-third of the disqualified votes (22,807) were concen-
trated in predominantly Black areas in South Florida.222  Moreover,
the under votes tended to be disproportionately in counties that were
poor with large Black populations.  The Supreme Court of the United
States reversed the ruling of the Florida Supreme Court.223  In a per
curiam decision, a divided Court held that the Florida Court’s defini-
tion of a legal vote violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment.224  The decision provided four explanations: (1)
the definition provides for variations of standards within counties; (2)
the order provides no assurance that the recounts included in a final
certification must be complete; (3) the order provides no specificity as
to who would recount the ballots; and, (4) the recount process is in-
consistent with the minimum procedures necessary to protect the fun-
damental right of each voter in the special instance of a statewide
recount under the authority of a single judicial order.225
In the per curiam decision, the majority insisted that the Florida
Supreme Court’s order did not include “a recount procedure. . . that
comports with minimal constitutional standards.”226  Instead of re-
manding the case to the Florida Supreme Court to devise a remedy in
conformity with the decision, the majority concluded that the safe har-
220. Id. at 315-16.
221. See U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, VOTING IRREGULARITIES IN FLORIDA DURING THE
2000 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION (2001).
222. See ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, SUPREME INJUSTICE: HOW THE HIGH COURT HIJACKED
ELECTION (2000); Bob Drogin, Two Florida Counties Show Election Day’s Inequities Vote, L.A.
TIMES, Mar. 12, 2001, at A1; Many Disqualified Votes in Minority Areas, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 1, 2000,
at 19.
223. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
224. Id.
225. See Bush, 531 U.S. at 129-35 (Souter, J., dissenting); DERSHOWITZ, supra note 222;
David A. Straus, Bush v. Gore: What Were They Thinking?, 68 U. Chi. L. Rev. 737 (2001); Cass
R. Sunstein, Order Without Law, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 757 (2001).
226. Bush, 531 U.S. at 136-43.
2004] 665
Howard Law Journal
bor of December 12 would be missed.  In his dissent, Justice Souter
argued that the loss of the “safe harbor” was not fatal.  Justice Gins-
burg criticized the majority for departing from the Court’s normal
view of the state courts construction of state law.227  “And not uncom-
monly,” Justice Ginsburg observed, “we let stand state-court interpre-
tations of federal law with which we might disagree.”228  Justice
Ginsburg insisted, “Rarely has this Court rejected outright an inter-
pretation of state law by a state high court.”229  She blamed the short-
ness of time for the recount on the “Court’s entry of a stay on
December 9.”230
Since Bush v. Gore, the Supreme Court has been much ana-
lyzed.231  The majority seemed to give minimum consideration to the
fact that voters were denied the right to participate in the election of
the President.  But rather, the greater emphasis is focused on the issue
of a “safe harbor.”  The participation of voters suffered before “con-
jured” niceties of the system, the principles of equality, seemingly,
succumbed to the interest of partisanship on the Supreme Court and
the elimination of a potential presidential succession crisis, ultimately
deciding the outcome of the Presidential Election of 2000.
E. The Avoidance of Racial Terminology
The avoidance of racial terminology is the final element of the
culture of racial diversionary standpatism.  The manifestation of this
element has been a gradual and unfolding process.  In Regents of Uni-
versity of California v. Bakke, the Supreme Court permitted the Uni-
versity of California Davis Medical School to use race as a plus in
admission decisions.232  The Bakke decision, however, stands for much
more.  First, a plurality would include Whites as a suspect class, re-
quiring the imposition of the strict scrutiny standard to race conscious
measures that impact Whites.  The plurality made no distinction be-
tween policies and programs designed to overcome culturally and his-
torically ingrained inequalities and race conscious policies that
subjugated African Americans.  Second, greater weight would be
granted to individualism than to group basis of rights.  And third, the
227. Id. at 135.
228. Id. at 136.
229. Id. at 139.
230. Id. at 143.
231. See, e.g., DERSHOWITZ, supra note 222; RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM AND
DEMOCRACY (2003); Straus, supra note 225; Sunstein, supra note 225.
232. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
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decision stands for the principle of stigmatizing benefactors of affirm-
ative action as unable to achieve success without special protection
based on a factor unrelated to individual worth.233  The stigma argu-
ment has been rejected as being ahistorical.  That is, Whites stigma-
tized African Americans long before affirmative action.  In fact, the
stigmatization of African Americans is linked to presumption of the
inferiority of African Americans and a carryover from slavery.234
The strict scrutiny standard has been coupled with racial stigma
as a powerful factor in the Supreme Court’s attack on race conscious
programs and policies that sought to eliminate racism and racial barri-
ers against African Americans.235  The Court seemed to grow weary
of race conscious measures by the late 1980s and early 1990s.  Justices
Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, Ginsburg, and Breyer replaced Jus-
tices Burger, Powell, Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and White.  For
the most part, the personnel of the Supreme Court tended to be right
of center.236  Justices, however, do not always vote the preferences of
the appointing President (for example Justices, Warren, Brennan,
Blackmun, Powell, and Souter).
The imposition of the strict scrutiny standard de-railed a set-aside
program put in place by the city council of the city of Richmond, Vir-
ginia.  The motivation of the race conscious measure was to overcome
widespread racism and racial discrimination in the construction indus-
try of Richmond, which was once the capital of the Confederate.
Speaking for the majority in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.,
Justice O’Connor distinguished the authority of Congress and states
and their political subdivisions under the Fourteenth Amendment.237
Justice O’Connor felt that the city of Richmond misinterpreted the
majority in Fullilove in which the Supreme Court sustained the consti-
tutionality of a congressional set-aside program relating to the con-
233. Id. at 284-321.
234. BONILLA-SILVA, supra note at 117; PIERRE-ANDRE TAGUEFF, THE FORCE OF
PREJUDICE: ON RACISM AND ITS DOUBLES (Hassan Melehy trans. & ed., University of Minne-
sota Press 2001).
235. Compare Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325, 2350-65 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993); and Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978),
with Sheet Metal Workers v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421 (1986); Firefighters v. Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501
(1986); United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 421 (1986); Fullilove v. Klutzmik, 448 U.S. 448 (1980);
and United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979).  All of these are cases in which race
conscious measures were sustained.
236. See DAVID O’BRIEN, STORM CENTER: THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN POLITICS
(2003); Twiley W. Barker & Michael W. Combs, Civil Rights and Liberties in the First Term of the
Rehnquist Court: The Quest for Doctrine and Votes, 1 NAT’L POL. SCI. REV. 31 (1989).
237. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
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struction industry.238  Unlike the city of Richmond, Justice O’Connor
insisted that Congress “has a constitutional mandate to enforce the
dictates of the Fourteenth Amendment,” which means that Congress
“may identify and redress the effects of society-wide discrimina-
tion.”239  Justice O’Connor gave little weight to the claim of past dis-
crimination and evidence of discrimination proffered by Richmond.
Employing strict scrutiny, Justice O’Connor noted dismissively,
“While there is no doubt that the sorry history of both private and
public discrimination in this country has contributed to a lack of op-
portunities for [B]lack entrepreneurs, this observation, standing alone,
cannot justify a rigid racial quota in awarding public contracts in Rich-
mond, Virginia.”240
Four years after Croson, the Supreme Court again voiced its ob-
jection to race conscious measures as it voided a re-districting plan
from North Carolina.  The effort by North Carolina was to comply
with the Voting Rights Act of 1965.  In Shaw v. Reno, the appellants
alleged that the two majority Black districts concentrated Black voters
arbitrarily without considering compactness, contiguousness, geo-
graphical boundaries, or political subdivisions so as to create congres-
sional districts along racial lines and to assure the election of two
Black representatives.241  Justice O’Connor spoke for a divided court.
Justice O’Connor utilized the strict scrutiny standard, arguing, “Classi-
fications of citizens solely on the basis of race ‘are by their very nature
odious to a free people whose institutions are founded upon the doc-
trine of equality.’”242  She believed that the reapportionment plan
reinforces the perception that members of the same racial group -
regardless of their age, education, economic status, or the commu-
nity in which they live–think alike, share the same political interests,
and will prefer the same candidates at the polls.  We have rejected
such perceptions elsewhere as impermissible racial stereotypes.243
For Justice O’Connor, such an approach “may exacerbate the
very patterns of racial bloc voting that majority-minority districting is
sometimes said to counteract.”244  Ignoring the long history of racial
discrimination in the creation of the politics of North Carolina and
238. Id. at 477-506.
239. Id. at 490.
240. Id. at 499.
241. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
242. Id. at 643 (quoting Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943)).
243. Id. at 647.
244. Id. at 648.
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opportunities in the state, Justice O’Connor wrote as if racism and
racial discrimination and their effects had been eliminated or never
existed.  Justice O’Connor strives for a color-blind society without up-
rooting and eradicating the values, beliefs, and significations of
inequalities.245
As Justice O’Connor heightened the argument against race con-
scious measures, other members of the Court also enlivened their ar-
guments in support of such policies and programs, especially in
reapportionment.246  Justice Souter, for example, contended that legis-
lators have to take race into account “as long as members of racial
groups have the commonality of interest implicit in our ability to talk
about concepts like minority voting strength, and so long as racial bloc
voting takes place . . . .” and, unlike other governmental decisions,
districting “denies no one a right or benefit provided to others.  All
citizens may register, vote and be represented.”247  Souter noted that
the Court
cases recognize the reality that members of the same race often
have shared interests.  ‘Dilution’ thus refers to the effects of district-
ing decisions not on an individual’s political power viewed in isola-
tion, but on the political power of a group.  This is the reason that
the placement of voters in a given district, even on the basis of race,
does not, without more, diminish the effectiveness of the individual
as a voter.248
Souter posited, “[U]nder the Voting Rights Act when communi-
ties are racially mixed, the legitimate consideration of race in district-
ing decision is usually inevitable.”249
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena symbolizes the triumph of
strict scrutiny in all instances in which the constitutionality of race
conscious measures is raised.250  In Adarand, the Supreme Court ex-
tended the application of the strict scrutiny in cases arising under the
equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment Due Process
Clause, abandoning the lenient standard, resembling the intermediate
scrutiny of Fullilove v. Klutznik and Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. Fed-
245. Id. at 641-47.
246. Id. at 658, 676, 679.
247. Id. at 682 (Souter, J., dissenting).
248. Id.
249. Id. at 683.
250. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
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eral Communication Commission.251  By the year 2003, the contro-
versy over race conscious measures was significantly joined.
Universities and the private and public sectors continued to employ
race conscious policies to enhance the representation of African
Americans, women, and historically disadvantaged groups.  Such poli-
cies are proffered as a means to overcome generations of exclusion
and to achieve diversity.  The University of Michigan found itself at
storm center because its College of Literature, Science, and Arts and
College of Law’s admission procedures included race conscious provi-
sions.  Eventually, the litigation reached the United States Supreme
Court in the cases of Gratz v. Bollinger252 and Grutter v. Bollinger253
revealing the centrality of race specific policy to the American culture
war.  The culture of racial progressive gradualism insists that race con-
scious measures are indispensable in the struggle to eradicate the val-
ues, beliefs, and built-in institutional and systemic elements that by
purpose and effect disadvantage African Americans, Hispanic Ameri-
cans, and Native Americans.  The culture of racial diversionary
standpatism takes the position that the values, beliefs, and institu-
tional and systemic elements of disadvantage are virtually non-exis-
tent.  Additionally, the perspective subscribes to the position that race
conscious measures do more harm to the benefactors of such policies
and the state of race relations than benefit.
In Gratz v. Bollinger, Chief Justice Rehnquist spoke for a sharply
divided Court.254  Chief Justice Rehnquist termed the automatic
twenty points assigned to African Americans, Hispanic, and Native
American applicants by the College of Literature, Science and Arts a
quota which was outlawed in such circumstances in Regents of the Uni-
versity of California v. Bakke.255  Relying on the strict scrutiny test,
Chief Justice Rehnquist held that the university’s use of race in its
current freshman admission policy is not narrowly tailored to achieve
the university’s asserted compelling interest of diversity.256  For Rehn-
quist, the policy did not provide for individual consideration of each
251. Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448
(1980).  In these two cases, the Supreme Court employed the intermediate scrutiny test where
race conscious measures are evaluated on the following basis: Do the measures serve important
governmental objectives within the power of Congress?  Are the measures substantially related
to achievement of those objectives?
252. 123 S. Ct. 2411 (2003).
253. 123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003).
254. Gratz, 123 S. Ct. 2411.
255. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
256. Gratz, 123 S. Ct. at 2440.
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applicant.  The Gratz decision challenges universities, particularly uni-
versities with tens of thousands of applicants, to design procedure to
constitutionally satisfy the asserted compelling interest in diversity.257
Several dissenting opinions were also filed.  Justice Souter, for ex-
ample, argued that the University of Michigan freshman admission
was closer to what Grutter approved than to what Bakke condemns.
Unlike in Bakke, Justice Souter contended the policy
lets all applicants compete for all places and values an applicant’s
offering for any place not only on grounds of race, but on grades,
test scores, strength of high school, quality of course of study, resi-
dence, alumni relationships, leadership, personal character, socio-
economic disadvantage, athletic ability and quality of a personal
essay.258
Justice Souter believed that the assignment of specific points does
not set race apart from all other weighted considerations.  Justice Sou-
ter declared,
The very nature of a college’s permissible practice of awarding
value to racial diversity mean . . . that race must be considered in a
way that increases some applicants’ chances for admission.  Since
college admission is not left entirely to inarticulate intuition, it is
hard to say what is inappropriate in assigning some stated value to a
relevant characteristic, whether it be reasoning ability, writing style,
running speed, or minority.  Justice Powell’s plus factors necessarily
are assigned some values.259
Justice Souter turned his attention to the admission systems used
at public universities in California, Florida, and Texas.  He directly
focused on the United States’ claim that Michigan could get diversity
that meets its compelling interest by “guaranteeing admission to a
fixed percentage of the top students from each high school in Michi-
gan.”260  Agreeing that the practices in those states were constitu-
tional, Justice Souter felt that the practice suffers from a serious
disadvantage.  “It is the disadvantage of obfuscation,” continued Sou-
ter, “The percentage plans are just as race conscious as the point
scheme (and fairly so), but they get their racially diverse results with-
out saying directly what they are doing or why they are doing it. . . .
257. See Lani Guiner, Admissions Rituals as Political Acts: Guardians at the Gates of Our
Democratic Ideals, 117 HARV. L. REV. 114, 172-98 (2003).
258. Gratz, 123 S. Ct. at 2441 (Souter, J., dissenting).
259. Id. at 2441.
260. Id. at 2442.
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Equal Protection cannot become an exercise in which the winners are
the ones who hide the ball.”261
Justice Ginsburg placed her dissent in the context of the contin-
ued existence and harmful effects that flow from “centuries of law-
sanctioned inequities [which] remain painfully evident in our commu-
nities and schools.”262  Justice Ginsburg argued that the disparities of
the recently ended race caste system endure:
unemployment, poverty, and access to health care vary dispropor-
tionately by race.  Neighborhoods and schools remain racially di-
vided.  African American and Hispanic children are too often
educated in poverty-stricken and underperforming institutions.
Adult African Americans and Hispanics generally earn less than
Whites with equivalent levels of education.  Equally credentialed
job applicants receive different receptions depending on their race.
Irrational prejudice is still encountered in real estate markets and
consumer transactions.  Bias both conscious and unconscious, re-
flecting traditional and unexamined habits of thought, keeps up bar-
riers that must come down if equal opportunity and
nondiscrimination are ever genuinely to become this county’s law
and practice.263
Justice Ginsburg contended that the implementation of the con-
stitutional requirement of equality demand that “government decision
makers may properly distinguish between policies of exclusion and in-
clusion.  Actions designed to burden groups long denied full citizen-
ship stature are not sensibly ranked with measures taken to hasten the
day when entrenched discrimination and its after effects have been
extirpated.”264
Justice Ginsburg addressed the issue of the color-blind Constitu-
tion.  Proponents of the culture of racial diversionary standpatism ar-
gue that race conscious policies offend the Constitution’s colorblind
requirement.  She believed that the constitution is “both color blind
and color conscious.”265  Quoting Judge Wisdom’s opinion in United
States v. Jefferson County Board of Education, Ginsburg argued,
[T]o avoid conflict with the equal protection clause, a classification
that denies a benefit, causes harm, or imposes a burden must not be
based on race.  In that sense, the Constitution is colorblind.  But the
261. Id.
262. Id. at 2443.
263. Id.




Constitution is color conscious to prevent discrimination being per-
petuated and to undo the effects of past discrimination.266
For Justice Ginsburg, Brown v. Board of Education permits color
conscious policies that are designed to “correct inequalities.”267  In
her view, the College of Literature, Science and Arts color conscious
procedure is designed to accord special consideration to racial and
ethnic groups that “have been relegated to inferior status by law and
social practice; their members continue to experience class based dis-
crimination to this day.”268
In Grutter v. Bollinger, a divided Court approved the University
of Michigan College of Law’s admission plan.  Unlike the College of
Literature, Science and Arts, the College of Law did not assign points
to historically disadvantaged racial and ethnic groups.  Applicants
were evaluated in terms of a personal statement, letters of recommen-
dation, an essay describing how the applicant will contribute to law
school life and diversity, the applicant’s undergraduate grade point av-
erage, and the Law School Admissions Test Score.  School officials
also assessed recommender’s enthusiasm, the quality of the under-
graduate institution, the applicant’s essay, and the area and difficulty
of undergraduate course selection.  Various circuits of the Courts of
Appeals disagreed on whether or not diversity constituted a compel-
ling interest.  The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit found that
diversity did not reach the threshold of a compelling state interest,
while the Sixth and Ninth Circuits concluded that diversity was a com-
pelling state interest.269
Speaking for a sharply fractured Court, Justice O’Connor turned
to Justice Powell’s opinion in Bakke for guidance.  O’Connor indi-
cated Justice Powell rejected the following: (1) racial balance for his-
torically disfavored racial and ethnic minorities as a compelling
interest; (2) the remediation of societal discrimination as a compelling
interest; and (3) increasing the number of physicians who would prac-
tice in communities currently underserved as a compelling interest.270
Justice O’Connor noted that Justice Powell approved the use of race
to further diversity.  Employing the strict scrutiny standard, Justice
266. Id.
267. Id. at 2445.
268. Id.
269. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325, 2336 (2003); Bollinger v. Grutter, 288 F.3d 732
(6th Cir. 2002); Smith v. Univ. of Wash. Law Sch., 233 F.3d 1188 (9th Cir. 2000); Hopwood v.
Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996).
270. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2336.
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O’Connor endorsed Justice Powell’s view that student body diversity
is a compelling state interest that can justify the use of race in univer-
sity admissions and rejected the assumption that the only governmen-
tal use of race that can survive strict scrutiny is remedying past
discrimination.  “Today, we hold that the Law School,” intimated Jus-
tice O’Connor, “has a compelling interest in . . . attaining a diverse
student body.”271
The Grutter Court deferred to the law school’s educational judg-
ment.  Justice O’Connor argued that universities occupy a special
niche in America’s constitutional tradition, noting that “[T]he impor-
tant purpose of public education and the expansive freedoms of
speech and thought associated with the university environment.”272
More directly Justice O’Connor insisted: (1) that the attainment of a
diverse student body is at the heart of the law school’s proper institu-
tional mission; (2) that the Court must presume “good faith” on the
part of a university absent a showing to the contrary; (3) that the de-
sire for a critical mass of students is defined by reference to the educa-
tional benefits that diversity is designed to produce; (4) that the law
school’s claims of a compelling interest is supported by amici who
pointed to the educational benefits that flow from student body diver-
sity, such as promoting learning outcomes, better preparing students
for an increasingly diverse workforce, and better preparing students as
professionals; (5) that education is the foundation for good citizen-
ship; (6) that universities and law schools represent the training
ground for a large number of America’s leaders; and (7) that the path
to leadership must be visibly open to talented and qualified individu-
als of every race and ethnicity.273
Justice O’Connor contended that educational benefits are not
theoretical, but real.  She referenced the briefs submitted by major
American businesses, high-ranking retired officers and civilian leaders
of the United States military.  According to Justice O’Connor, the
competitiveness of American businesses in today’s increasingly global
marketplace “can only be developed through exposure to widely di-
verse people, cultures, ideas, and viewpoints.”274  In terms of the mili-
tary, Justice O’Connor observed, “[T]he primary sources for the
Nation’s officer corps are the service academies and the Reserve Of-
271. Id. at 2339.
272. Id.
273. Id. at 2339-41.
274. Id. at 2340.
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ficers Training Corps (ROTC), the latter comprising students already
admitted to participating colleges and universities.”275  Quoting from
Amici Curiae Brief 27, O’Connor noted, “[T]he military cannot
achieve an officer corps that is both highly qualified and racially di-
verse unless the service academies and the ROTC used limited race-
conscious recruiting and admission policies.”276  She added that “it re-
quires only a small step from this analysis to conclude that our coun-
try’s other most selective institutions must remain both diverse and
selective.”277  Finally, Justice O’Connor held that the University of
Michigan Law School admission program met the requirement of be-
ing narrowly tailored because it provides for individualized considera-
tion of each and every applicant, arguing that race conscious
admissions policies must be limited in time.278  The durational require-
ment “can be met by sunset provisions in race-conscious admissions
policies and periodic reviews to determine whether racial preferences
are still necessary to achieve student body diversity.”279  Justice
O’Connor claimed race conscious measures “are potentially . . . dan-
gerous.”280  In the end, Justice O’Connor concluded the Equal Protec-
tion Clause does not prohibit the University of Michigan Law School’s
narrowly tailored use of race in admissions decisions to further a com-
pelling interest in obtaining the educational benefits that flow from a
diverse student body.
In his dissent, Justice Thomas argued that the law school’s admis-
sions policy stigmatized African Americans as being inferior and lack-
ing the capacity to achieve.  “I believe African Americans can
achieve,” contended Justice Thomas, “in every avenue of American
life without the meddling of university administrators.”281  Justice
Thomas argued, “[W]hen African Americans take the highest places
of government, industry and academia, it is an open question whether
their skin color played a part in their advancement.  The question it-
self is the stigma.”282  Justice Thomas indicated that the race conscious
policy failed to meet the compelling interest of strict scrutiny: (1) na-




278. Id. at 2346.
279. Id.
280. Id.
281. Id. at 2350 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
282. Id. at 2362.
2004] 675
Howard Law Journal
view, there was no real distinction between the educational benefits of
racial diversity and racial balancing.  Justice Thomas seemed enor-
mously bothered by the elitism of the University of Michigan Law
School.  Justice Thomas, also, pointed to research that supported the
view that educational diversity hinders learning among African Amer-
icans which suggests that African Americans attending historically
Black public colleges and universities reported higher academic
achievement than those attending predominantly white colleges.283
Justice Thomas questioned the system of selective admission, discuss-
ing how the system was utilized to restrict the number of Jews.  Justice
Thomas dismissed the factor that the opportunities of African Ameri-
cans were so depressed that there was no need to employ a selective
admission procedure to restrict the admission of African Americans.
He also objected to the present day LSAT on which African Ameri-
cans tend to perform poorly.  Justice Thomas insisted, “[T]he Law
School’s continued adherence to measures it knows produces racially
skewed results is not entitled to deference by this Court.”284 Quoting
Justice Harlan’s dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson, Justice Thomas ad-
vanced the color-blind argument, “[O]ur Constitution is color-blind,
and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens.”285
CONCLUSION: THE CLASH OF CULTURES
In this Article, the clash of cultures has been conceptualized in
terms of two broad categories: (1) the culture of racial progressive
gradualism; and (2) the culture of racial diversionary standpatism.
Brown v. Board of Education constitutes one of the first instances in
which an American institution actually tackled the cultural basis of
racism and racial discrimination.  During oral arguments, it was clear
that the justices and counsel for and against the constitutionality of
segregation understood the probable impact of the Brown decision on
racial symbols, values, attitudes, and traditions of the south and more
generally of America.  But, then, few persons were prophetic enough
to grasp fully the depth and ways in which the Brown decisions would
clash with the culture of the white supremacy embedded and reflected
in the system of Jim Crow.
283. Id. at 2358.
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Revisiting Brown
In Brown v. Board of Education, the Supreme Court instituted a
paradigmatic departure from the separate but equal doctrine constitu-
tionalized in Plessy v. Ferguson and the historical processes that gov-
erned race and race relations in America.  The separate but equal
doctrine and historical processes were premised on inferiority and su-
periority of African Americans and Whites.  Both the inferiority of
African Americans and superiority of Whites were anchored in the
ideologies of racism and liberalism that were allies in the denial of
freedom, individualism, equality, and self-worth to African Ameri-
cans.  Early in the cultural-history of America, the institution of slav-
ery, and other forms of racial discrimination against African
Americans were justified in biological explanations and divine crea-
tion.  Even today, elements of these explanations resonate in the val-
ues, beliefs and attitudes of some Americans.286
In Brown, the Supreme Court gave constitutional footing to the
culture of racial progressive gradualism which has the following attrib-
utes: (1) the salience of societal, historical, and present-day racism and
discrimination in shaping the interactions between African Americans
and Whites; (2) the necessity of an active role of government, espe-
cially the Federal government, in the disestablishment of the values of
racism and the inequalities premised on white supremacy and segrega-
tion; (3) the employment of race conscious measures and terminology
to describe and address the values, significations and traditions that
advantage Whites and disadvantaged African Americans; and (4) an
emphasis on the harmful and persistent consequences of racism and
its expressions on the lives of African Americans.  Congress and the
President gave support to the culture of racial progressive gradualism
in the 1960s through the efforts of the Kennedy and Johnson adminis-
trations.  The Civil Rights Act of 1964 reflected the triumph of Brown
and its perspective.
However, just as Brown clashed with the culture of Jim Crow and
its White supremacy values and racial inequalities, a counter-culture
movement emerged in the 1960s that opposed Brown’s culture of ra-
cial progressive gradualism.  This counter-culture, which is referred to
as the culture of racial diversionary standpatism, demonstrates the in-
terconnection of culture, party and electoral politics, policy and the
structure of government.  The counter-culture movement tapped the
“White backlash” that resulted from the Civil Rights Movement, and
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the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as well as the desire of
supporters of white supremacy and segregation to maintain those tra-
ditions.  The strategy of Goldwater in 1964 provided the basis and
thrust for the culture of racial diversionary standpatism.
The elements of the culture of racial diversionary standpatism in-
clude: (1) a minimalist approach to federal and governmental power;
(2) a conciliatory disposition to the interests and conveniences of
Whites and to the cost of change to the system; (3) the move from
biological inferiority of African Americans to the biologization of cul-
ture; and (4) the avoidance of any direct reference to race or racial
terminology in the discussion of racism and racial discrimination.
Over the past forty years, there has been a persistent cultural
clash between the culture of racial progressive gradualism and the cul-
ture of racial diversionary standpatism.  The Supreme Court has been
an active participant in the clash of these two cultures.  The decisions
of the Supreme Court, since the 1970s, have tended to promote the
interests that support the culture of racial diversionary standpatism.
This does not, however, mean that there have not been decisions that
advance interests that favor the culture of racial progressive gradual-
ism.  Even so, the tenor of appointments to the Supreme Court, and
the doctrines and tests that emanate from the Court, tend to under-
mine the culture supported by Brown and subsequent decisions of the
1950s and 1960s.
In conclusion, this research effort has given us insight into the
connection between racism and liberalism and the pattern of interac-
tion between African Americans and Whites, the effects of the Su-
preme Court and other governing institutions on the racial culture of
America, and the persistence and survivability of cultural values, atti-
tudes, traditions, symbols, inequalities, and significations over the his-
tory of this nation.
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